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LOUISIANA LEGISLATION OF 1946
theory being that the courts must be independent from the other
branches of the government. But whether the constitutional
requirement likewise limits the power of the legislature to in-
crease the compensation of judges during their terms of office
is a matter subject to inquiry and possible judicial interpretation.
The adjudicated cases by the Louisiana courts are conspicu-
ously silent on this point, the question apparently never having
been raised despite the fact that salaries of judges have been
increased from time to time (to be effective) during their terms
of office.'7
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
DALE E. BENNETT*
Amendments to Criminal Code-Placing Combustibles
The Louisiana Criminal Code of 19421 abandoned the tradi-
tional method of dividing and subdividing crimes with a special
criminal statute for each of the various ways in which a crime of
a particular type might be committed. Instead, it provided broad,
carefully drafted, general definitions of the basic offenses. For
example, the definition of theft in Article 67 eliminated previous
technical distinctions and replaced approximately one hundred
special stealing crimes whose scope and particular limitations
had been a source of much litigation and confusion. A number of
bills introduced in the 1946 legislature, which would have re-
verted to the old practice of having a special statute for each
particular way in which a crime might be committed, were re-
jected as being out of keeping with the spirit and purpose of the
Criminal Code. One amendment to the Criminal Code was
adopted. Louisiana Act 305, proposed by the Criminal Law Sec-
tion of the State Bar Association and approved by the Louisiana
State Law Institute, re-amended Article 54 of the Criminal Code
Orleans was held unconstitutional on the grounds the statute attempted to
direct payment out of the judicial expense fund. No mention, however, was
made of the constitutional provision above cited. It would seem, however,
that any change made in the salary, whether favorable or unfavorable, would
"affect" such salary as well as the judge receiving such salary.
17. Cf. La. Act 3 of 1928 (E. S.) and La. Act 24 of 1936 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 14291 raising the salaries of the justices of the Supreme Court from
$8,000.00 to $10,000.00 and $12,000.00 respectively; La. Act 2 of 1928 (E. S.)
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 1454] raising salaries of the judges of courts of appeal
from $6,000.00 to $8,000.00 and La. Act 83 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
1516.1] increasing the salaries of district judges from $5,000.00 to $6,000.00
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Louisiana Act 43 of 1942.
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(placing combustibles) so as to eliminate a difficulty created by
a poorly considered 1944 amendment.2 The 1944 amendment had
apparently been proposed and adopted as a result of a misun-
derstanding as to the nature and purpose of that article. Article
54 was originally included in the chapter dealing with the arson
crimes in order to plug up a loophole as to the requirements of
attempted arson. It provided that the collection and preparation
of combustibles for the purpose of later setting fire to them was
sufficient to constitute an "attempt" to commit arson. It did not
purport to create a special crime of "placing combustibles," but
rather sought to show that such activity would constitute at-
tempted arson. Pursuant to the general attempt article (Article
27), the offender who was guilty of attempted arson would be
punished in accordance with the type of arson committed-the
penalty being fixed at one-half of that for the consummated
offense. The 1944 amendment reverted to the old practice of
treating "placing combustibles" as a separate offense, regardless
of the type of arson contemplated; and it was defective in two
important particulars:
(1) It punished any placing of combustibles, regardless
of the circumstances. Thus it would include the case of a man
burning his own barn to get rid of rats. In this unrestricted
form the statute probably failed to adequately state a crime.
(2) It failed to distinguish between the seriousness of the
arson crime ultimately contemplated, providing the same
penalty for the person who places combustibles to set fire to
a crowded theatre (aggravated arson) as for the person who
contemplates the lesser offense of setting fire to his own
property to collect the insurance (arson with intent to de-
fraud).
Act 305 of 1946 amended Article 54 of the Criminal Code so as to
eliminate the patent deficiencies created by the 1944 statute. At
the same time, it is more explicit than the original Article 54
in indicating that it merely purports to define an attempt as
punished under the general attempt article read in connection
with the appropriate arson articles of the Criminal Code.
Miscellaneous Criminal Statutes
Two minor criminal statutes aimed at particular evils which
were not within the general purview of the Criminal Code should
be briefly noted.
2. Louisiana Act Ill of 1944.
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Act 50 makes the scalping of admission tickets to athletic
contests, theaters, and other public amusements a misdemeanor.
This provision, if enforced, will do much to protect the gullible
public in the post-war inflationary era. Act 151 makes it a mis-
demeanor to administer drugs or any other artificial stimulants
to race horses, or for any jockey to conspire or conduct himself
in such a manner as to throw a race. Here again the legislature
is making an effort to protect the sporting public from those
who would manipulate public athletic exhibits-in this case
horse racing-so as to secure an unfair pecuniary advantage at
the expense and ruination of the sport involved.
Amendments to Code of Criminal Procedure
Act 261, sponsored by the Criminal Law Section of the Lou-
isiana State Bar Association, amended Article 498 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure which governs the necessity and scope of
the bill of exceptions. The reservation of a bill of exceptions
serves a multiple function: it again calls the trial judge's atten-
tion to the ruling complained of and gives him an opportunity
to correct his error; it lays the ground work for a motion for a
new trial in case of conviction; and it presents the issues in such
a form as to enable the appellate court to pass on them in case
a motion for a new trial, based thereon, is denied by the lower
court. The generally accepted rule that a bill of exceptions must
be taken to every adverse ruling of the trial judge, does not, by
the very nature of things, apply to the overruling of a motion
for a new trial based upon alleged trial irregularities to which
bills of exceptions have already been reserved. The trial judge
has, by the motion for a new trial, been given an opportunity to
correct his errors; also, the alleged erroneous rulings are already
a part of the record by appropriate bills of exceptions. In the
recent case of State v. Houck,' the supreme court appropriately
held that the overruling of a motion for a new trial, based upon
matters which were already in the. record by bills of exceptions,
was appealable without defense counsel resorting to the super-
fluous step of taking a bill of exceptions to that ruling. Were it
not for the fact that a long list of previous supreme court deci-
sions have apparently taken the view that a bill of exceptions
is required, the law would have been well settled by the Houck
case. However, the jurisprudence was still in a very uncertain
state and an attorney whose motion for a new trial had been
3. 199 La. 478, 6 So. (2d) 553 (1942).
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overruled was met with the practical consideration that he must
take no chances on the confused nature of the law. He must,
therefore, out of abundant caution, reserve a bill of exceptions
to the overruling of his motion for a new trial. The reservation
of such a bill entailed a certain amount of labor, and the prac-
tice, if continued over a long period of time, might have become
so accepted that eventually the courts would refuse to recognize
a departure therefrom. 4 As a practical solution to the problem,
Act 261 amends Article 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
so as to codify the rule of the Houck case and make it clear that
a bill of exceptions need not be reserved to the overruling of a
motion for a new trial "based upon bills of exceptions reserved
during the trial."
Act 260, sponsored by the Criminal Law Section of the Lou-
isiana State Bar Association, amended Article 85 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure so that it would conform with a 1936 amend-
ment to Article I, Section 12, of the Louisiana Constitution.'
This amendment had liberalized the provision for bail pending
appeal from a conviction in felony cases. The original constitu-
tional provision, as did Article 85 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, prohibited bail pending appeal, except where a sentence
of less than three years had been imposed. This provision was
altered in 1936 so as to permit bail in any case where the sen-
tence was less than five years. The amended Article 85 now con-
forms to this more liberal provision. Actually, the constitutional
provision has always been controlling and the amendment to
Article 85 merely eliminates any confusion which might arise
from the nonconformity of that provision.
Most Louisiana lawyers are familiar with the much-publi-
cized case of Willie Francis, Negro murderer, who, according to
the arguments of ingenious counsel, had been accorded "a par-
don by Act of God," when the portable electric chair failed to
function. Counsel also urged that any further efforts to execute
the sentence would constitute "cruel and unusual punishment."
The arguments of Willie's attorneys were promptly rejected by
the Louisiana Supreme Court and by the Pardon Board. The
United States Supreme Court granted a temporary stay of execu-
tion until it could pass upon the beclouded legal and sentimental
4. See Comment (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 453, discussing the ne-
cessity for a bill of exceptions to the overruling of a motion for a new trial.
This student comment by Gordon L. Richey served as the basis for the draft-
ing of Act 261.
5. Louisiana Act 189 of 1936.
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issues raised by defense counsel. In order that such a situation
may not again arise, Act 149 amends Article 570 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure so as to require that the operator of the
electric chair shall be "a competent electrician."
Act 80 is a "salary raiser" which increases the salaries of
the process servers in Orleans Parish. It also increases the funds
available for the salaries, expenses and allowances of the jury
commissioners in that parish.
EDUCATION
In General
Acts 168, 297, 307, and 376 of 1946. These statutes amend
various sections of the Board of Education Act.1 Formerly, of the
eleven members composing the board, three were appointed by
the governor, and eight were elected at large from the present
congressional districts, for terms of eight years each.2 Act 307 of
1946 provides for the election of all the members, three from the
districts corresponding to the present public service commission
districts, and eight from the congressional districts. The terms
of the outgoing members are extended, however, until their suc-
cessors have been elected.3
The Superintendent of Education is now authorized to- set
up appropriate divisions within the department and to select
and employ the necessary personnel, subject however to the ap-
proval of the board which has been given the power to either
confirm or veto any appointments made by the superintendent.
A simple majority of the members of the board is sufficient for
this action.4 Formerly, the superintendent enjoyed this power
independently of the board.
Formerly, the teachers' tenure section of the act was by its
terms restricted and covered only employees of the parish school
systems, no provision being made for the inclusion of employees
of city school boards.' Act 297 of 1946 corrects this omission and
makes the tenure provisions applicable to the employees of both
city and parish school boards.
Act 376 of 1946 merely empowers parish school boards to
1. La. Act 100 of 1922, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2220 et seq.].
2. La. Act 100 of 1922, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2220].
S. This act is not to become effective until the proposed constitutional
amendment (La. Act 392 of 1946), providing for the reorganization of the
board, has been ratified.
4. La. Act 168 of 1946.
5. La. Act 100 of 1922, § 48 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2267].
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adopt resolutions authorizing the various parish superintendents
to use check-signing machines in signing payroll checks, and,
incidentally, authorizes the different depositaries of funds to pay
checks signed in this manner.
Act 162 of 1946., Act 52 of 1918,6 which has been expressly
repealed, was at the same time virtually re-enacted by this sta-
tute whereby the state accepts the benefits provided by the Con-
gress of the United States in the promotion of agriculture, trade
and industry, and designates the state treasurer as the custodian
of the moneys to be received from the federal government. The
authority to administer and expend these funds, which was
formerly vested on the board of education and on representatives
of the state federation of labor, is now exclusively conferred on
the board.
Act 38 of 1946. A special educational committee of eight
members of the legislature to be appointed by the Governor has
been created by this act. The stated purpose of this committee
is to make a study and survey of the needs and necessity for im-
provement in all the state public schools, colleges and universi-
ties. The committee is vested with authority to conduct hearings,
to administer oaths and to compel attendance of witnesses and
the production of books and records under subpoena. Under the
general appropriation act, twenty thousand dollars was voted
for the expenses thereof.
Four other brief acts affecting general education policy
passed in the 1946 session are not of sufficient interest to the
legal profession to warrant special comment here.7
6. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2323 et seq.
7. Act 33 of 1946 merely changes the name of Louisiana Negro Normal
and Industrial School to "Grambling College of Louisiana."
Act 65 of 1946 prohibits the driving of school buses by persons under
eighteen years of age and makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to hire for
driving, or to drive a school bus by a person under the prescribed age, pun-
ishable by fine or imprisonment.
In 1944, the Department of Education was authorized to establish and
maintain special classes for the education of physically handicapped child-
ren between the ages of five and twenty-one years. La. Act 163 of 1944
[Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 2348.01). Act 77 of 1946 provides, in addition,
for the establishment of special classes of elementary school level for phy-
sically handicapped persons between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-five
years of age.
After declaring the policy of the state to be the promotion of health
among the school children of the state, the legislature recommends (Act
155 of 1946) that officials of the public and private schools furnish milk with
the free lunches provided for school children.
[VOL. VII
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Appropriations
Considerable sums were appropriated by the legislature to
the educational program of the state. Besides an increase of
nearly two million dollars made in the general appropriation act
for each year of the biennium8 various other special appropria-
tions were voted. The sum of $3,146,882.00 was made available
by Act 148 exclusively for the purpose of raising the salaries of
teachers in the public schools whose pay was less than $3,600.00
per annum. One hundred thousand dollars was made available
to the board of education for the vocational rehabilitation of
persons disabled in industry;9 four hundred thousand dollars for
the "further development of vocational agriculture, industrial
and homemaking education" of veterans; 10 a half million dollars
was appropriated for the construction of veterans' housing fa-
cilities on the campuses of various state colleges;" $50,000.00 for
each year of the biennium was set aside to provide educational
opportunities in schools and colleges located outside the state for
the specialized, professional and graduate education of negro
students;12 $344,870.00 was voted for construction and improve-
ments at the Baton Rouge Trade School, 3 and $37,500.00 for "on
the job training" of veterans."
Teachers' Retirement and Leaves of Absence
Act 44 of 1946.'1 Act 83 of 193616 provided for the retirement
of teachers at age sixty, and at age fifty-five after thirty years
of service. This provision has been amended by providing, in
addition, for retirement after thirty-five years of continued serv-
ice regardless of age, and by adding a proviso for the retirement
of teachers -separated from active service "against their will"
who are unable to secure employment elsewhere as teachers,
provided however, they have met the age requirement. Also, the
employee contributions to the teachers retirement fund have
8. The various schedules in the general appropriation act (La. Act 66 of
1946) show a total Increase of $1,853,118.00.
9. La. Act 136 of 1946.
10. La. Act 141 of 1946.
11. La. Act 46 of 1946.
12. La. Act 142 of 1946.
13. La. Act 175 of 1946. This was a re-appropriation of funds previously
appropriated which would have elapsed on June 30, 1946. The remaining
appropriations voted by this act and totalling $4,582,050.00 for construction
of buildings in other state colleges were vetoed by the governor without
comment.
14. La. Act 134 of 1946.
15. This act became a law by limitation.
16. La. Act 83 of 1936, § 5 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2404.5J.
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been increased from four to five per cent, except that no deduc-
tions are to be made on that portion of any salary in excess of
six thousand dollars per annum.
Act 198 of 1946. Act 228 of 19447 provided for the allocation,
out of the public school fund, of sixty thousand dollars annually to
be paid by the state treasurer into the teachers retirement fund,
to be used in providing old age assistance to public school teach-
ers not entitled to or not eligible for retirement under the sys-
tem, and to provide supplementary retirement benefits to teach-
ers receiving in the aggregate, less than seven hundred dollars
in retirement benefits. The 1946 statute increases the funds to
be allocated to the retirement system to ninety thousand dollars
and teachers retiring on or after July 1, 1946, are made eligible
for supplementary benefits if the aggregate benefits to which
they would otherwise be entitled are less than nine hundred
dollars per annum.
Act 235 of 1946. The statute regulating sabbatical leaves of
public school teachers 8 has been amended to provide that ab-
sence on sick or emergency leave " will not interrupt the length
of active service required to qualify under the provisions of the
act for such leaves.
Scholarships
Act 23 of 1946. This act provides for the free education in
the colleges and universities of the state of children between
the ages of sixteen and twenty-one years, of war veterans who
were in active service between December 7, 1941, and June 30,
1946. Although the beneficial character of this measure cannot
be doubted, the statute is intrinsically bad in that the body of
the act is broader than its title.2 0 Whereas the body is sufficiently
broad to include the children, within the prescribed age limits,
of veterans who served within the stated dates, the title restricts
the operation of the statute to the children of veterans who were
killed in action or died from other causes as a result of service
in the armed forces. Since the provisions are not separable, it is
hoped the matter will be brought to the attention of the legisla-
ture for correction at an early date.
17. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 2404.19.
18. La. Act 319 of 1940, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) §2386.3].
19. La. Act 125 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 2386.17] provides
for a minimum of 10 days' sick or emergency leave without loss of pay.
20. State v. Cotton, 128 La. 749, 55 So. 342 (1911). See also State v. Ki-
shaw, 158 La. 203, 103 So. 704 (1925).
[VOL. V11
LOUISIANA LEGISLATION OF 1946
Act 380 of 1946. Under the provisions of Act 287 of 193621
Louisiana State University was required to provide scholarships
to each member of the legislature for two students to be selected
by each of them, except for study in the schools of medicine and
music. Act 380 of 1946 broadens the former statute by requiring
all state supported colleges and universities to provide these
scholarships. Since no exceptions are made, it is evident the
scholarships are good for any branch of study in any of the dif-
ferent schools.
ELECTIONS
In General
Act 123 of 1946. An appropriation of $62,500.00 was voted by
this act to cover one-half of the purchase price of voting ma-
chines for use in the Fourth Ward of Caddo Parish. The act,
however, is not to be effective until the use of voting machines
has been approved by the electorate of the Parish.
Act 262 of 1946. This act provides that, in cities of more than
three hundred thousand inhabitants, an independent candidate
for any office (except that of a member of the Orleans Parish
School Board) who has not been previously nominated by a
recognized political party in a primary election and who wishes
to become a candidate at a general election, must pay five thou-
sand dollars into the Office of the Secretary of State to be used
by him to defray the expenses of holding the election.
Registration of Voters
Acts 247, 266, and 267 of 1946. Various sections of the Regis-
tration Law of 19401 were amended by these acts. Act 247 is de-
signed to exempt inmates of the United States Marine Hospital
at Carville from the provisions in the statute prohibiting inmates
of charitable institutions from registering and votng. In connec-
tion with this act, the following must be noted: (1) It is presently
in conflict with the constitutional provision that prohibits the
registration of inmates of charitable institutions;2 (2) Act 388 of
1946, which is a proposed constitutional amendment to be sub-
mitted to the electorate in November, is also designed to ex-
empt the inmates of Carville from the prohibition presently ex-
21. La. Act 287 of 1936, as amended by La. Act 343 of 1938 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 2555.11.
1. La. Act 45 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 2615.1 et seq.].
2. La- Const. of 1921, Art. VIII, § 6.
19461
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isting; (3) neither the proposed amendment, nor the statute
"amending" the registration statute contain any indication that
it was intended that the act was to become effective upon adop-
tion of the constitutional amendment, or that the proposed
amendment will validate the companion legislation. It follows,
therefore, that although Article XXI, Section 2, of the Constitu-
tion of 1921 authorizes the legislature to enact legislation to be-
come effective upon adoption of a proposed constitutional amend-
ment, nevertheless the jurisprudence to the effect that such leg-
islation is invalid unless that intention is clearly expressed in
the statute, or unless the amendment itself expressly provides
it is to have retrospective effect, does not appear to have ever
been overruled.3 Consequently, it necessarily follows that Act
247 of 1946 will be inoperative and that the provisions in the
present statute will have remained unchanged. On the other
hand, however, if the proposed constitutional amendment is
adopted, it and not the statute will govern, and consequently, in
order to have the statutory provisions conform to the new pro-
visions of the constitution, another amendment will technically
be necessary.
Another change in the registration act was accomplished by
Act 266 of 1946 under which the registrar of votes is no longer
required to establish a registration office at or near the polling
places, but may do so at his discretion, except in the parishes of
Orleans, East Baton Rouge and De Soto.4
Act 267 of 1946 merely extends the 1941 registration, which
had been previously extended until 1946, until December 31,
1948. Any elector, therefore who has registered since January
1st, 1941, will be eligible to vote without the necessity of further
registration until 1949.
Primary Election Law
Acts 221, 231, 243, 351, and 366 of 1946. Different sections of
the Primary Election Statute of 1940 were amended by these
acts. Under Section 89 of the original statute, if a person was
convicted of any violations of that law, he was ineligible, for four
3. ]tchison Drilling Co. v. Fournoy, 131 La. 442, 59 So. 867 (1912). See
also Peck v. City of New Orleans, 199 La. 76, 5 So. (2d) 508 (1941).
4. La. Act 45 of 1940, Art. III, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 2615.24]
provided: "In all parishes (parish of Orleans excepted) the registrar of
voters .... shall ... establish his office for at least one day, at or near
each polling place ... "; by the 1946 amendment the word "shall" was
changed to "may."
5. La. Act 46 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 2682.5 et seq.].
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years thereafter, for employment by the state or any political
subdivision thereof. Act 221 of 1946 has re-enacted the section
with all its penalty provisions except the ineligibility for em-
ployment clause, so that conviction under the statute is no longer
a bar to subsequent state employment.
Parish executive committee members were required to meet
within fifteen days after their election for the purpose of or-
ganizing and electing their own officers." As amended, the statute
nbw provides that this meeting be held not less than forty-five
nor more than fifty days after their election.7
The date for the meeting of the central committees for the
purpose of calling primary elections of candidates to the United
States Congress and candidates to the state judiciary whenever
they are to be elected at congressional elections has been changed
from the first Tuesday in July to the third Tuesday in May, pre-
ceding the primary election. The date for the election, however,
remains unchanged as the second Tuesday in September follow-
ing the meeting."
Committees of political parties authorized to order primary
elections for the nomination of municipal or ward officers were
required to meet one hundred and eleven days prior to the date
fixed for the election for the purpose of ordering the election.9
This meeting is now to take place at any time within a period not
more than one hundred and twenty-six nor less than one hundred
and eleven days before the date fixed for the primary election. 0
Whenever a special election is to be held to fill vacancies,
committees are now authorized to fix the date at which the pri-
mary will be held, as well as the last day and hour on which
candidates should qualify. 1 Formerly, they were merely autho-
rized to fix the date for the primary and the last day for the
qualification of candidates.
Relative to candidates, the following changes were also
made: Candidates against whom objections have been filed with
the chairman or secretary of the committee have seventy-two
instead of forty-eight hours after service of the objections, to file
their answers thereto; 1 2 prospective candidates must file notice
6. Id. at § 15 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 2682.19].
7. La. Act 351 of 1946, § 1.
8. La. Act 243 of 1946.
9. La. Act 46 of 1940, § 25 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 2682.29).
10. La. Act 351 of 1946.
11. La. Act 40 of 1946, § 26, as amended by La. Act 351 of 1946.
12. Id. at § 28, as amended by La. Act 351 of 1946.
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of intention to become such by five o'clock, Central Standard
Time, on the tenth day after the issuance of the call for the pri-
mary, whether the election is for state, parochial or municipal
officers;' 3 the deposit which candidates are required to make
with the chairman of the respective committees is no longer re-
turned to the candidate in case he is disqualified after a hearing
on oppositions filed, but is to be kept by the committee as costs
for hearing of the opposition;' 4 and the additional fees required
of candidates for incidental expenses of the committees, have
been increased from a maximum of $100.00 to a maximum of
$110.00.1-
Regarding the ballots, the changes made are perhaps insig-
nificant. It is now required that all sample and official ballots
must be designated as such in black, instead of red ink.' Of more
practical importance is the new requirement imposed upon reg-
istrars of voters to certify to the Secretary of State the number
of registered voters in each precinct, so as to enable the secretary
to determine more accurately the number of ballots which, under
the statute, he is required to send to each precinct.17
With regard to polling booths, Act 231 of 1946 provides that
these may be set up within the confines of the United States
Marine Hospital at Carville,'8 and in the case of adjoining pre-
cincts, the former provision requiring that polling booths be
placed at least three blocks apart has been omitted. 9
The one other statute amending the primary election law is
Act 366 of 1946, under which the clerk of court of the parish
where elections are held will from now on receive a copy of the
tally sheets compiled by the election commissioners, who are re-
quired to make an additional copy for that purpose.
INSURANCE
In General
Act 288 of 1946. Two significant changes regarding the non-
forfeiture of insurance policies after payment of a stipulated
number of premiums have been made. Under Act 93 of 1906, as
13. Id. at § 30, as amended by La. Act 351 of 1946. Notice of intention
had to be filed within 20 days, if the candidacy was for a state or district
office, and within 10 days if for parochial or municipal office.
14. La. Act 46 of 1940, § 32, as amended by La. Act 351 of 1946.
15. Id. at § 32(e), as amended by La. Act 351 of 1946.
16. Id. at § 42, as amended by La. Act 351 of 1946.
17. La. Act 351 of 1946.
18. La. Act 231 of 1946.
19. La. Act 46 of 1940, § 49, as amended by La. Act 351 of 1946.
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originally enacted, a policy contract which had been in effect for
three years did not lapse for failure to pay subsequent prem-
iums, but the insured was given the option of obtaining the cash
surrender value thereof, or of applying the accumulated reserve
to the purchase of extended or paid-up insurance.' If the insured
failed to exercise an option, the accumulated reserve was auto-
matically, under the terms of the statute, applied to the purchase
of extended insurance,2 and any provision in the policy contract
which required the insured to select in advance which option
would be availed of should there be a default in premium pay-
ments was unenforceable. The reason for this was that the in-
sured who permitted the policy to go unpaid would neither
obtain cash surrender value nor extended insurance, since he
would be obligated from the inception of the policy to accept
what would be more advantageous to the company: that is, paid-
up insurance.8
Act 57 of 19324 changed the provisions of the 1906 statute
governing the application of the accumulated reserve by pro-
viding that if no other option contained in the policy was availed
of by the insured, the accumulated reserve, without any further
act on the part of the insured, was to be applied, either to the
purchase of extended or paid-up insurance, at the option of the
insured., Under this amendment, therefore, insurance companies
were no longer required to apply the reserve to the purchase of
extended insurance, but could, on the failure of the owner to
pay subsequent premiums and exercise any of the options stated
in the policy, apply the reserve either to the purchase of paid-up
or extended insurance.
Did the 1932 amendment in any way modify the right of the
insured to the options originally granted by the statute of 1906?
In the case of Edwards v. National Life & Accident Insurance
Company,6 the court of appeal held that a clause which forces
the insured to agree, at the time the contract is entered into, to
what benefit he will be entitled to after the lapse of the policy
1. La. Act 93 of 1906, §§ 1, 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4115, 41161; Succes-
sion of Watson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 183 La. 25, 162 So. 790
(1935).
2. Furlong v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co., 185 La. 352, 169 So.
431, 106 A. L. R. 40 1(1936).
3. Succession of Watson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 183 La. 25,
162 So. 790 (1935).
4. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4116.
5. Furlong v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co., 185 La. 352, 169
So. 431, 106 A. L. R. 40 (1936).
6. 11 So. (2d) 125 (La. App. 1943).
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did not deprive him of the optional rights and privileges con-
ferred upon him by law. In that case, the policy contract con-
tained a provision to the effect that in the event of default in the
payment of premiums after three years, the policy would auto-
matically be commuted to paid-up insurance. The company ad-
vanced the plausible contention that since the insured had died
without demanding the application of the accumulated reserve
toward the purchase of extended insurance, the automatic pro-
vision applying the reserve to paid-up insurance was enforceable
under the very terms of the 1932 amendment. The court pointed
out, however, that the automatic clause gave the insured no
option but obligated him, from the moment of the issuance of
the policy, to accept paid-up insurance upon default of premiums
after three years, and that under the terms of the statute, it was
only upon the failure of the owner to avail himself of an ex-
pressed option, after the policy had lapsed, that the insurer was
authorized to apply the reserve.'
Act 288 of 1946 was evidently enacted for the purpose of over-
ruling the decision in the Edwards case and to give effect to
clauses exacting an election from the insured at the time of is-
suance on all policy contracts issued prior and up to the effective
date of the act. The statute provides that if no other option ex-
pressed in the policy is exercised by the insured, "the policy
shall provide for [the reserve] to be applied to the automatic
option shown in the policy, which automatic option shall be" to
purchase either extended or paid-up insuranceY It will be ob-
served that this provision is to govern only with regard to poli-
cies issued prior to the effective date of the act, 10 all future poli-
cies being governed by an additional section referred to as the
"standard non-forfeiture clause"" under which the insured must
elect, within sixty days, between cash surrender value and paid-
7. Edwards v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 11 So. (2d) 125, 128
(La. App. 1943); "In the instant case, the insured was granted no privilege
or option as to the manner in which, upon the lapse of the policy, the reserve
would be applied. She was obligated from the moment of the issuance of the
policy to accept a paid-up value whenever the policy lapsed after the pay-
ment of three years premiums. Under this restrictive stipulation the statu-
tory proviso 'if no other option expressed in the policy' became, as was said
in the Watson case, 'meaningless'. . . . Furthermore, it is only upon the
failure of the owner to avail himself of an expressed option .... that the
insurer is authorized to apply the reserve. This right of the insurer is, there-
fore, conditional .. "
8. La. Act 193 of 1906, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4116], as amended by
La. Act 288 of 1946.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. La. Act. 193 of 1906, § 2-A, as added by La. Act 288 of 1946.
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up insurance. It is further provided that the paid-up benefit will
become effective automatically unless the insured elects another
available option not later than sixty days after the due date of
the premium in default.
While the 1906 statute applied to life, as well as to industrial,
policies and made policies non-forfeitable after premiums had
been paid for three years, the new non-forfeiture clause of Act
288 of 1946 makes it optional with industrial insurance com-
panies either to elect to come under the statute or to be governed
exclusively under the provisions of Act 148 of 1936,12 which pro-
vides that in the event of default of premium payments, after
premiums have been paid for five years, the insured is entitled
to a stipulated form of insurance, the net value of which shall
be equal to at least two-thirds of the reserve on the policy at
the date of default.
It is to be noted that, although the right granted the insured
to receive any benefit upon failure to meet his premiums rests
on statute and the legislature has the power to stipulate the
standards under which these benefits shall be granted, the trend
in favor of the insured, which began with the passage of the 1906
act, now seems to be turning in favor of the insurer. At least, the
insurer, under the 1946 act, is in a better position to state the
terms under which the insured will receive the statutory bene-
fits in the event of default in the payment of premiums.
Act 113 of 1946. This is a new statute prohibiting, with cer-
tain specified exceptions, domestic insurance companies from in-
suring residents of a reciprocal state, which, as defined by the
act, is a state which prohibits a domestic insurer thereof from
insuring Louisiana residents unless such insurer is authorized to
do business in Louisiana. This statute further requires the Secre-
tary of State to notify domestic companies from time to time
which are the reciprocal states whose residents may not be in-
sured by them.
Act 116 of 1946. This act is designed to protect the corporate
name of domestic or foreign insurance companies authorized to
do business in Louisiana by providing that the corporate name
of any such company cannot be deceptively similar to that of
either (1) any domestic or foreign company doing business in the
state, (2) any person or unincorporated association where such
person or association has filed an intention to incorporate within
12. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4131.11.
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the last preceding seventeen months, or (3) any foreign insur-
ance company not then authorized to do business in Louisiana,
if it has, within the last preceding twelve months, signified an
intention to incorporate in this state.
Act 248 of 1946. This act authorizes foreign insurance com-
panies doing business in this state to invest up to fifteen per
cent of their total capital and net surplus in revenue producing
real estate.
Act 296 of 1946. Under this act the Secretary of State is re-
quired at least once in every three years, or oftener if necessary,
to visit each life insurance company organized under the laws
of Louisiana on the legal reserve plan authorized to issue policies
in excess of twenty-five hundred dollars on any one life. The
purpose of this visit is to examine thoroughly its financial con-
dition and ascertain whether it is complying with all the require-
ments of law.
Act 289 of 1946. Act 7 of 1932, Section 4,18 provided for an
annual license tax on insurance companies, graduated on the
gross premiums received. It was also provided, however, that
the amount of the tax payable should be only one-third of the
amount so fixed, if the company were able to show that at least
one-sixth of the total admitted assets were invested in either
bonds of this state or subdivisions thereof, in mortgages on prop-
erty located in this state, or in policy loans to individual resi-
dents or domestic corporations of Louisiana. The 1946 statute
amends this section so as to extend the above reduction in the
license tax in favor of companies which can show that at least
one-sixth of their total admitted assets are invested in stock of
domestic homestead building or loan associations, to the extent
that such stock is guaranteed or insured by the federal insurance
deposit corporation or other federal agency.
Fire and Marine Insurance
Act 205 of 1946. This statute created the "Louisiana Inland
Marine Rating Commission" composed of three menbers, one
of which is the Secretary of State and two others appointed by
the governor. The Secretary of State is to receive a per diem of
twenty-five dollars and the other two members are paid on a
salary basis. One of these latter serves as chairman and is paid
$5,000 a year, while the other is secretary and is paid $3,600.
The commission is domiciled in Baton Rouge, with powers to
13. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8707.
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regulate inland marine insurance rates on risks located in Lou-
isiana, and the act requires every inland marine insurer doing
business in Louisiana to sign an agreement with the Secretary
of State that he will abide by, and comply with, the rates ap-
proved and with the rules and regulations which the commis-
sion adopts. The purpose of the legislation is undoubtedly to
establish a uniform rate for inland marine insurance risks in the
state.
Act 349 of 1946. Under the provisions of Act 302 of 192614
the Louisiana Insurance Commission and the Louisiana Rating
and Fire Prevention Bureau (the latter to be under the super-
vision of the commission) were created for the purpose of de-
termining and fixing equitable premium rates to be charged on
fire, windstorm, hail and automobile fire and theft insurance.
All stock fire insurance companies were brought under the opera-
tion of the act and made subject to the regulations imposed
thereby. Section 21 of that act, although excepting mutual in-
surance companies from most of the regulations, subjected them
to certain sections, particularly Sections 2 and 9, which provided
for investigation by the commission in all cases of complaints of
discriminatory or excessive rates. Act 349 of 1946 has further
subjected these mutual companies to the provisions of Sections
8 and 17 of the original act, as amended, which require all com-
panies coming under its provisions to file with the commission
a schedule of rates showing the compensation which each com-
pany will pay its agents for the ensuing calendar year, including
the rate of commissions to be earned, with the exception of the
salaries of company representatives or agents employed solely
on a salary basis. The amended portion further grants all com-
panies subject to regulation the right, not previously provided
for, to apply for a hearing before the commission when aggrieved
by a ruling of the bureau on questions of rates, the findings of
the commission being further subjected to judicial review.
Industrial, and Life and Accident Insurance
Act 292 of 1946. A new paragraph has been added to Section
9 of Act 20 of 1935 (2 E. S.).115 The original section merely lim-
ited the value of health and accident insurance policies to
$5,000.00. As now amended, it further requires that every policy
contain a clause reserving the right of the company to increase
the rate of dues or assessments or to levy additional assessments
14. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4221 et seq.
15. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4170.22.
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against the insured to the extent that may be necessary to pay
their respective share of losses in cases where the mortuary fund
becomes depleted. The proceeds of such increase, however, are
to be placed to the credit of the fund and no part thereof is to be
used for expenses of management.
Act 293 of 1946. Act 20 of 1935 (2 E. S.) 16 was also amended
by Act 293 of 1946. Section 10 of the statute provided that 33%
per cent of the total income received by health and accident in-
surance companies from premiums, assessments, dues, and mem-
bership fees, could be used for the payment of salaries of officers,
agents and other employees. The remaining 66% per cent must
be placed to the credit of the mortuary fund exclusively for the
payment of benefits. To this section has been added a proviso
which authorizes these companies to use for the expenses of
management, the entire income received from premiums, assess-
ments or membership fees on new policies in any one year, and
to permit them to pay, at the option of the companies, insurance
taxes and other fees from the mortuary fund.
Act 121 of 1946. This act amends the provisions of Act 114
of 189817 relative to the reserve of industrial and service insur-
ance companies permitting maximum reductions of seventy per
cent thereof on all policies issued prior to January 1, 1937, forty
per cent on policies issued between January, 1937, and December,
1946, and twenty-five per cent on all policies issued after January
1, 1947. Within the maximums above specified, the reductions
are permitted only to an amount equal to a discount given by a
funeral director furnishing the services contracted, evidenced by
a contract duly entered into between the company and the di-
rector. If a company elects to avail itself of the reductions per-
mitted, it must not pay any dividends to stockholders unless the
reserves are equal to seventy-five per cent of the face value of
funeral policies, and one hundred per cent of the cash policies.
Act 291 of 1946. Regarding the graduated deposit to be made
by industrial life insurance companies with the Secretary of State
as a prerequisite to doing business, Act 148 of 1936, Section 7,18
provided that this deposit could be made from reserves or other
funds in securities "as are now required by surety companies."
Act 291 of 1946 is more specific, requiring this deposit to be made
in bonds of the United States or of the State of Louisiana or other
16. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4170.23.
17. Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4053, 4054.
18. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4131.7.
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political subdivisions thereof having a population of not less than
twenty-five hundred inhabitants with an assessed valuation of
not less than two million five hundred thousand dollars. In case
where the deposit is to be made in state or political subdivision
bonds, it is further required that these be payable both in prin-
cipal and interest from the proceeds of a direct unlimited ad
valorem tax dedicated for that purpose.
Act 290 of 1946. With regard to the paid-up capital stock
which industrial life insurance companies are required to have
as a prerequisite to doing business, Act 148 of 1936 provided for
a capital stock of one hundred thousand dollars fully paid up in
cash, when the maximum amount of the policies or benefit cer-
tificates to be issued on a single life did not exceed in. the aggre-
gate the sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, exclusive of double
indemnity, or more than fifty dollars per week for sickness or
disability benefits. This was evidently a typographical error in
the act which is now corrected by providing that the paid up
capital stock should be one hundred thousand dollars when the
maximum amount of the policies and benefits to be issued do
not exceed twenty-five hundred dollars.
Act 115 of 1946. Section 3 of Act 148 of 193619 required every
industrial life insurance policy to have a clause providing for a
"stated cash payment" in the event a change of domicile of the
insured made it impractical for the company to furnish the
services contracted for. The 1946 amendment requires that this
"stated cash payment" cannot fall below seventy-five per cent
of the value of the service as stated in the contract.
Act 271 of 1946. This act amended the service insurance law
by requiring that all such companies engaged in service insur-
ance business as defined by the act, must have a capital stock of
not less than five thousand dollars as a prerequisite to doing
business in the state, as well as net admissible assets to the value
of five thousand dollars, and a paid-in capital stock of five thou-
sand dollars. Prior to this amendment, the act required a mini-
mum of five hundred dollars of capital stock and fifteen hundred
dollars in net assets and paid in capital.2 0
Acts 81, 82, 84 and 99 of 1946. These acts all amend Section
7 of the service insurance companies act,2 with the result that
there are now four different versions of the same section.
19. Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4131.3.
20. La. Act 136 of 1938, §§ 2, 3 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4170.33, 4170.34].
21. La. Act 136 of 1938, § 7 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4170.38].
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Briefly, the original section was composed of six paragraphs
numbered consecutively. The first three defined "service insur-
ance" companies for the purposes of the act as all companies
contracting for the following benefits and services: (1) funeral
benefits not exceeding three hundred dollars; (2) hospitalization
benefits and the drugs incidental thereto, upon sickness or phy-
sical disability, and (3) home nursing care under the supervision
of graduate nurses in cases of sickness or other physical disabil-
ity. Paragraph 4 provided for the issuance of term policies only,
incontestable after one year except for non-payment of premiums.
Paragraph 5 required all policies to contain a clause providing
for "a stated cash payment in lieu of services" where the insured
was absent from the domicile so as to make it impracticable for
the company to furnish the service contracted for, and paragraph
6 exempted fraternal societies from the provisions of the act.
Act 81 of 1946 inserted a new provision (referred to as para-
graph 4) so as to include in the definition of service insurance
companies, those contracting for the erection of monuments of a
value of not more than three hundred dollars; the old paragraphs
4, 5, and 6 thus became paragraphs 5, 6, and 7, respectively. Act
82 merely re-enacted the section in its original form, amending
paragraph 5 thereof so as to provide that in case of impractica-
bility of performance on the part of the company because of the
absence of the insured, the stated cash payment to be paid in
lieu of services should not be less than seventy-five per cent of
the face value of the policy.
Act 84 also re-enacts the section in its original form except
that paragraph 2 includes not only companies contracting for
hospitalization and drugs, but also companies contracting for the
services of physicians and surgeons. It also provides that com-
panies contracting for the latter services must have increased
their paid-up capital stock by one thousand dollars.
Act 99 contains only five paragraphs. It omits the original
paragraph 3 which defined as service insurance companies those
furnishing home nursing care upon sickness or disability, so that
the original paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 have become paragraphs 3,
4, and 5, respectively. Taken alone, Act 99 brings within the
operation of the act only those companies contracting for hospi-
talization and those contracting for funeral benefits, with the
added proviso that in cases of hospitalization insurance, the in-
sured will have the option of obtaining the service in any hospi-
tal or sanitarium of his choice.
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This raises the question as to whether all four acts are ef-
fective. A similar situation arose in 1938 when the legislature
amended, in three separate statutes, Act 165 of 1932 designating
the legal holidays in the state.22 At that time, the office of the
attorney general rendered an opinion to the effect that the act
last in order of approval governed. This opinion overlooked,
however, that all laws go into effect at the same time, and that
precedence should not be given to a statute over another if effect
can be given to all of them without conflict.28 Fortunately, the
1938 statutes were repealed at a subsequent session of the legis-
lature and an act adopted which embodied the provisions of all
former acts. 24
Although each of these acts is different, neither is necessari-
ly in conflict with the others and they can all be given effect
without abrogating any of their provisions. A composite statute
would have seven subsections or paragraphs as follows: (1)
original paragraph 1, which was not altered in any way by any
of the amendatory statutes; (2) original paragraph 2, as amended
by Act 84 of 1946; (3) original paragraph 3, included in all other
amending acts without change except in Act 99 of 1946; (4) new
paragraph 4, injected into the statute by Act 84 of 1946; (5)
original paragraph 4, which was not altered by any of the amend-
ing acts; (6) original paragraph 5, as amended by Act 82 and Act
99 of 1946; (7) original paragraph 6, not altered in any way by
any of the amending statutes.
The only possible conflict would arise in proposed paragraph
6. As above stated, the original paragraph 5 as amended by Act
82 of 1946 requires all policies to contain a provision for a "stated
cash payment, not less than 75 per cent of the face value of the
policy, in the event the absence of the insured from the domi-
cile, makes it impracticable for the company to furnish the serv-
ice contracted for." Act 99 omits this provision in toto, but pro-
vides instead that in cases of hospitalization insurance, the in-
sured has the option of obtaining hospitalization in any hospital
or sanitarium of his choice. A situation may arise where, because
of the absence of the insured, who has bought hospitalization in-
surance, it is impracticable for the company to furnish the serv-
22. La. Acts 84, 91 and 307 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3795].
23. Mlddleton v. Police Jury of the Parish of Jefferson, 169 La. 458, 125
So. 447 (1929). Contra: McVay v. New Orleans Public Service, 148 So. 67
(La. App. 1933).
24. La. Act 285 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3795]. For a discussion of
the problem see Hebert and Lazarus, The Louisiana Legislation of 1938
(1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 80, 138.
1946)
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ice contracted for, in which case, the company would make use
of the clause inserted in the policy contract and pay seventy-five
per cent of the benefits. But Act 99 gives the insured the right
to choose any hospital and does not limit him to a hospital of his
domicile, the inference being that the insured may demand the
full value of the contract in services rendered in a hospital other
than that of his domicile, irrespective of whether it is impractical
for the company to pay such benefits. It can be reasonably im-
plied, however, that what the legislature had in mind was tc
limit the cash payment option to services other than hospitali-
zation. In this manner this conflict may be resolved, but it is
hoped that the legislature will pass curative legislation at its
next session in order to forestall likely litigation on the matter.
Act 114 of 1946. This act requires all industrial life and life,
health and accident insurance companies to submit for the ap-
proval of the Secretary of State all policy forms, endorsements
and riders to be issued, as well as application blank forms.
LABOR AND INDUSTRY
Labor Organizations
Two statutes affecting labor unions and their members were
passed at the recent session of the legislature. Act 180 of 1946
declares it to be the policy of the state that labor disputes affect
the public interest and should be settled fairly and, so far as is
possible, without interruption or delay in production and distri-
bution; and to that end it declares it to be the duty of employers
and employees alike to negotiate their contracts in good faith,
to be binding upon and enforceable against both parties. Because
of the importance of this legislation, it will be discussed in detail
in a forthcoming issue of this Review. Further comment here is
therefore omitted.'
The other statute enacted, which will also be discussed more
at length in another portion of this volume, affects the recipients
of unemployment compensation when unemployment is due to a
labor dispute. Under Section 4 of the unemployment compensa-
tion act,2 an employee otherwise eligible for weekly compensa-
tion was disqualified for a period not exceeding three weeks, if
1. A comment is being prepared on this act as well as on the companion
measure, H. B. 105 vetoed by the governor, which will appear in the January
issue.
2. La. Act 97 of 1936, as amended by La. Act 160 of 1944 [Dart's Stats.
(Supp. 1946) § 4434.1 et seq.].
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his unemployment was due to a labor strike in progress at the
place where he was employed, unless it was shown that he
neither participated nor was directly interested in the strike and
that he was not a member of the class of workers actually strik-
ing or directly interested in the strike The 1946 amendment dis-
qualifies an individual who is otherwise eligible for compensa-
tion in all cases-where his unemployment is due to a dispute in
which he is actually participating or in which he is directly in-
terested. The provisions limiting the period of disqualification to
three weeks has thus been omitted. On the other hand, a claimant
who becomes unemployed by reason of a labor dispute may still
recover unemployment benefits upon showing that he is not
actually striking or directly interested in the strike, whereas
previously, he was further required to prove that he did not be-
long to the class of individuals who were actually striking.'
Minors and Women
A statute of 1942 regulates the hours of work of women em-
ployed in industry generally, by fixing a maximum work week
of forty-eight hours. Excepted from the provisions of the law
were women employed in certain industries, and particularly
women employed in stenographic or other clerical work, except
when employed by laundries, hotels and restaurants.5 Act 383
of 1946 adds to the class of workers not covered by the act, file,
route, and information clerks; multiple, teleprinter, switchboard,
telephone and telegraph operators.
Boys over the age of twelve years, who, during the war and
for ninety days after the termination thereof were specially per-
mitted to sell and deliver newsprint over fixed routes in resi-
dential areas," may continue to do so under the provisions of Act
3. Id. at § 4 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 4434.41. "An individual shall not
be eligible for benefits: ... (d)For any week with respect to which the
Administrator finds that his unemployment Is due to a labor dispute which
is in active progress at the factory ... at which he is or was last em-
ployed. Provided, that such disqualification shall not exceed the three weeks
immediately following the beginning of such dispute; and provided further
that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the
Administrator (1) he is not participating in or directly interested in the
labor dispute which caused his unemployment, and (2) he does not belong
to a grade or class of workers of which immediately before the commence-
ment of the dispute there were members employed at the premises at which
the dispute occurs, any of whom are participating In or directly Interested
in the dispute. .. ."
4. La. Act 181 of 1946.
5. La. Act 183 of 1942, § 10 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 4342.21].
6. La. Act 9 of 1944, §1 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 4325].
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186 of 1946 which has re-enacted the war measure on a perma-
nent basis.
Firemen and Policemen
Act 59 of 19427 prescribes minimum wages for firemen in
accordance with certain schedules based on the population of the
municipalities where they are employed, but no provision was
made in the act which would limit the number of hours of work.
Act 179 of 1946 has supplied the deficiency by amending the per-
tinent provisions and establishing a maximum of seventy-two
hours of work in any one calendar week except in emergencies,
but in such cases firemen who will be required to work overtime
will be paid time and one-half for each hour in excess of the
maximum established. In addition, this amendment makes the
provisions of the act relative to wages and hours of work inap-
plicable to firemen in municipalities having a population in
excess of three hundred thousand.
With regard to the members of the state police, the act cre-
ating the department8 likewise failed to provide for a maxinum
of working hours. Unlike the above amendment to the firemen's
act, however, Act 369 of 1946 merely authorizes the superinten-
dent of police to arrange the hours of work of each employee so
that none will work more than six days per week without being
given compensatory time off.
LAWS AND LEGISLATURE
In General
A special appropriation of fifteen hundred dollars for each
year of the biennium was made by Act 42 of 1946 in favor of the
Board of Commissioners for the Promotion of Uniformity of
Legislation.' The Board was originally created in 19022 "to ex-
amine the subjects upon which uniformity of legislation.. . . is
desirable" and to consider and draft uniform legislation for sub-
mission and adoption by the several states. Although since its
creation, twenty-four uniform statutes have been adopted in
7. La. Act 59 of 1942 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) §§ 5726.1 et seq.].
8. La. Act 94 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9307.1 et seq.].
1. The functions of this board were transferred to the Department of
Justice under the reorganization statute of 1940, which was later declared
unconstitutional. See La. Act 47 of 1940, tit. 25, § 5 (Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946)
§ 7789.154].
2. La. Act 39 of 1902 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9671 et seq.].
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Louisiana8 no previous appropriations appear to have been made.
The present appropriation is to defray the expenses of the three
members who compose the board while travelling in the official
business of the board, and to contribute two hundred and fifty
dollars to the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
State Laws.
The Louisiana State Law Institute, which, since its inception
in 1938 as a law revision commission and legal research agency
for the state, has largely contributed towards law improvement
and reform, has, in addition to its other tasks,' been instructed
by the legislature to prepare a draft of a projet for a constitution
of the state. 5
The magnitude of this task is enormous, but the institute is
no longer a novice in the art of law reform. The Louisiana
Criminal Code of 19426 is but one instance in which the institute
has demonstrated its ability, and the fact that the legislature has
3. The Commission apparently has functioned for the legislature and
thus far adopted 24 uniform laws: Uniform Narcotics Act, La. Act 14 of
1934 (E.S.); Uniform Principal and Income Act, La. Act 81 of 1938; Uniform
Proof of Statutes Act, La. Act 66 of 1922 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 2041-2042];
Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, La. Act 221 of 1908 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§
9859-9918]; Uniform Bills of Lading Act, La. Act 94 of 1912 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) §§ 8065-8118]; Uniform Trust Act, La. Act 81 of 1938 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) H§ 9850.1-9850.101]; Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, La. Act 64
of 1904 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 790-986]; Uniform Sale of Securities Law,
La. Act 262 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) §H 1179.1-1179.23]; Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, La. Act 180 of 1910 [Dart's Stats. (1939) H§ 1180-1205];
Uniform Guardianship Act, La. Act 71 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6162,
6164, 6164.1]; Uniform Acknowledgments Act, Foreign, La. Act 154 of 1916
[Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 6544-6547]; Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Probated,
La. Act 92 of 1916 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9729-9733]; Uniform Business
Corporation Act, La. Act 250 of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 3561]; Uniform
Act for Extradition of Persons of Unsound Mind, La. Act 221 of 1918 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) §§ 3831-3836]; Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, La. Act
176 of 1912 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9728]; Uniform Federal Tax Lien Regis-
tration Act, La. Act 99 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) H§ 8987-8987.6];
Uniform Fiduciaries Act, La. Act 226 of 1924 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9836-
9849]; Uniform Flag Act, La. Act 220 of 1918 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1939) §§ 1202-
1208]; Uniform Foreign Depositions Act, La. Act 34 of 1922 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§§ 2008-2010]; Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, La. Act 151 of 1914 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) §§ 2186-2189]; Uniform Act on Close Pursuit, La. Act 284 of
1936 [Dart's Crim. Stats. (1939) § 646.1-646.9]; Uniform Airports Act, La.
Act 222 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 27.1-27.13]; Uniform Act to Secure
the Attendance of Witnesses From Without the State in Criminal Cases, La.
Act 285 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939)§§ 738.1-738.8]; Uniform Unauthorized
Insurers Act, La. Act 159 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) §§ 4022.20-
4022.30].
4. At present, the Institute is undertaking a revision of the statutes
under the authority of La. Act 42 of 1942 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) §§
10011-10012].
5. La. Act 52 of 1946.
6. State v. Brown, 41 La. Ann. 771 (1889); State v. Land, 131 La. 611,
59 So. 1007 (1912); State v. Scallan, 160 La. 162, 106 So. 731 (1925); State v.
McBrayer, 188 La. 567, 177 So. 699 (1937).
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entrusted this important assignment to the institute is ample
proof of the legislature's recognition of this fact.
In the field of insurance, the legislature has recognized the
need for an integrated body of laws coordinating the various
statutes, and to this end, it has entrusted the secretary of state to
make a survey of the insurance laws of other states and to draft
a projet of an insurance code for submission and approval by the
legislature in 1948.
Also, the commission presently engaged in the task of survey-
ing the tax laws of the state has been continued, and the date
for the submission of the proposed Revenue Code for the ap-
proval of the legislature has been extended until 1948.
Constitutional Limitations
Article III, Section 16, of the Constitution of 1921 provides
that all laws must embrace but one object and have a title "in-
dicative of such object."
Does an act which purports to amend an existing statute
meet with the above constitutional requirement by merely re-
ferring to the number of the statute to be amended without
quoting its title? This question, which arises in connection with
three of the acts adopted at the 1946 session, is not altogether
free from difficulty.
The title of Act 18 of 1946 merely states it is an act "to amend
Section 8 of Act 15 of the Third Extraordinary Session of the
Legislature for the year 1934 . . ." but it gives no indication as
to the title of the "amended" statute nor as to the object of the
amendment.
The jurisprudence is well settled that an amending act need
not state the nature or the object of the amendment." Is it neces-
sary then that the title of the amended statute be set out in full
in the title of the amendatory act? The courts have held that the
title of an act which states the object to be to amend and re-enact
a section of the Revised Statutes, only the number of which is
given, meets with the constitutional requirement.7 But in none
of the adjudicated cases has been found one in which the statute
amending an independent act, as distinguished from particular
sections of the Revised Statutes, or articles of the Civil Code or
Code of Practice, failed to contain in its title the title of the
amended statute. However, the dictum found in the adjudicated
7. State v. Garrett, 29 La. Ann. 637 (1877); State v. Cognevich, 124 La.
414, 50 So. 439 (1909).
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decisions seems to indicate the courts will favor amendatory leg-
islation which identifies the amended laws simply by number
without the necessity of quoting in full the title thereof. No
stronger language than that found in State v. Cognevich8 can be
quoted to indicate the attitude of the courts in this respect. In
that case the court made the following statement:
"To the contention that the title of the act would be sufficient
if it read simply, 'An Act to amend Act 35 of 1894,' we answer
that no one could doubt it after the decisions of this Court in
State v. Brown, 41 La. Ann. 771, 6 South. 638, and other cases
"~9
There appears to be no valid reason why an amendatory
statute should contain a full quotation of the title of the amended
act. The custom seems to be a carry-over from earlier practice
in this state, when the amended acts were not referred to by
number and year, but merely by title and date of approval. 10
Thus it was difficult to identify the amending legislation with the
act to be amended, unless a reference was made to the title of
the act affected thereby. The prevailing practice, therefore, seems
wholly unnecessary, and much time could be saved by omitting
from amendatory legislation the full quotation of the title, of the
acts amended.
Another instance where the legislature departed from its
present practice in citing in full the titles of amended statutes
is Act 371 of 1946. In this instance, however, the purpose of the
amendment is stated in the title, which is to provide a method
of procedure in suits against the state under the provisions of
Act 20 of 1914, which it amends. Certainly, the "object" of the
act is fully stated in the title and the act to be amended is fully
identified by number.
Still another variation is found in Act 232 of 1946 which is
an act "To amend the title of act 13 of the Special Session of
1940 . . . and to amend and re-enact section 1 of that act (which
makes it unlawful for the state . . . to expend public funds for
advertising . . .)." Although the amendatory statute fails to
8. State v. Cognevich, 124 La. 414, 50 So. 439 (1909).
9. 124 La. 414, 419, 50 So. 439, 442.
10. Cf. La. Act 101 of 1854 entitled: "An Act to amend an Act entitled
'an act to provide . . . etc.' approved April 30th, 1853" and Act 140 of the
same year entitled: "An Act to repeal an Act entitled 'An act to regulate
the terms of the District Courts . . .' approved First March Eighteen Hun-
dred and Fifty Four."
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quote in its title the title of the amended act, yet a synopsis of
the provisions of the act to be amended is given. It is submitted
all three of these statutes comply with the constitutional require-
ment.
MOTOR VEHICLES
The 1946 legislation relative to motor vehicles includes an
amendment to the automobile registration license statute of 19381
permitting taxicabs, which upon payment of a twenty-five dol-
lars license fee were heretofore permitted to operate only within
the limits of incorporated cities and towns, and within a radius
of seven miles beyond. Under the 1946 amendment they are
further enabled to operate between a municipality and its air-
port, regardless of distance, when incidental to the transporta-
tion of passengers travelling by air.2 This statute was enacted
no doubt to relieve the transportation problem between cities
and airports and particularly to supplement the insufficient trans-
portation facilities existing between the City of New Orleans and
Moisant International Airport.
Persons operating vehicles weighing in excess of the pre-
scribed weights for which they are licensed are now subject to
a specific penalty of not more than one hundred dollars or im-
prisonment not exceeding thirty days or both.3 The wartime
measure permitting increased load weights and overall length
of vehicles used by common or contract carriers has been made
permanent by the adoption of Act 304 of 1946. 4
By Act 219 of 1946, municipalities have been authorized to
provide, by ordinance, for the installation of parking meters on
streets to be designated by them.'
Perhaps the most important measure regarding the operation
of automobiles is Act 255 of 1946 providing for the licensing of
all operators throughout the state. Heretofore, no general state
supervision over automobile drivers was exercised, and, except
for the provisions of Act 286 of 1938 providing for the examina-
tion and licensing of chauffeurs, there was no law regulating the
driving of motor vehicles in general. This act is undoubtedly the
1. La. Act 285 of 1938.
2. La. Act 374 of 1946.
3. La. Act 109 of 1946. Other violations are likewise punishable by a
fine not in excess of $100.00 or imprisonment not exceeding thirty days. Note
that no minimum penalties are provided for.
4. See also La. Act 20 of 1946.
5. La. Act 219 of 1946.
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result of the greater emphasis currently being placed on increased
safety on the public highways.
Briefly, the act provides for the licensing of all operators
and chauffeurs who have passed the prescribed examination,
which, however, may be dispensed with in the case of persons
presently operating a motor vehicle. In this respect the act is
perhaps only an encouraging gesture in the right direction. How-
ever, the juvenile problem has been met by provisions prohibit-
ing minors under fifteen years to drive, nor will a license be is-
sued to minors fifteen years or over unless their applications are
signed by their parents or tutor. In addition, chauffeurs' licenses
will not be issued to minors under eighteen years of age.
The power of the legislature to regulate the use of motor
vehicles on the public highways of the state and the state's right
to require a license in furtherance of its regulatory powers is
generally recognized, and constitutional objections against the
imposition of license fees as an unauthorized use of the taxing
powers have consistently been rejected., The theory upon which
these licensing statutes have been upheld is that the fee charged
is for the purpose of defraying the expense necessarily incurred
in issuing the license.7 This would be true of the present statute
except for the special provisions which are undoubtedly designed
to apply to the City of New Orleans. The act provides that in
cities having a population of three hundred thousand or over,
the license fee will be two dollars for an operator's license and
five dollars for a chauffeur's license, as contrasted with one dol-
lar and three dollars, respectively, elsewhere. Also, in cities hav-
ing a population of three hundred thousand or over, one-half of
the fee charged for drivers' licenses and two dollars of the five
dollar fee charged for chauffeurs' licenses is to be placed to the
credit of the local police pension fund. There seems to be no
relation between the regulation of traffic on the highways and
the pensioning of local policemen, and therefore it would appear
there is no valid reason for the imposition of a higher license
fee in larger cities, especially since the increase is to be used for
purposes admittedly not connected with, or incidental to the is-
suance of the licenses.
6. Bozeman v. State, 7 Ala. App. 151, 61 So. 604 (1913); Lowe v. Simmons,
185 Miss. 88, 187 So. 214 (1939); Unwen v. State, 73 N. J. 529, 64 At. 163 (1906).
7. It is entirely settled that under the police power a license fee can be
imposed within the limit of the expense necessarily or probably incurred
in issuing the license, and of inspecting and regulating the business the
license covers. Bozeman v. State, 7 Ala. App. 151, 61 So. 604 (1913).
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NAVIGATION
Harbor and Terminal Districts
The Lafayette Harbor and Terminal District, governed by a
board of commissioners composed of five members to be appointed
by the police jury of the Parish of Lafayette, was created by Act
14 of 1946. The board is invested with all the necessary author-
ity, similar to that enjoyed by other harbor district commission-
ers, to regulate the commerce and traffic of the harbor and to
issue bonds and incur debt for the construction and maintenance
of harbor facilities.
Also, for the purpose of improving and maintaining naviga-
tion in the Mermentau River and adjacent streams the Jennings
Navigation District was brought into being by Act 254 of 1946.
The board of commissioners of the district, which serves as its
governing body, is likewise conferred full authority to regulate
the commerce and traffic on the river and to incur debt,. secured
by bonds, for the purpose of constructing facilities in aid of
navigation.
Port of New Orleans
The Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans was
required to make various annual reports to the governor concern-
ing the financial status of the port and the extent of traffic for
the preceding year. The contents required in each report varied,
but in substance they were alike and necessarily contained many
duplications.1 Act 318 of 1946 was undoubtedly designed to cor-
relate all these into one single report and thereby avoid unnec-
essary duplications. The act requires the Board of Commission-
ers of the Port of New Orleans to publish an annual report in
lieu of all other reports heretofore required, showing such sta-
tistical and financial data as may be necessary to indicate the
nature, extent and results of the operations of the port. Copies
of this document are to be sent to the governor, the supervisor of
public funds and to the state auditor.
Locks and Levees
The Board of Levee Commissioners for the Orleans Levee
District and the Board of Commissioners of Grand Prairie Levee
District have been jointly authorized to rebuild the recently
1. Cf. La. Acts 70 of 1896, § 7; 180 of 1908, § 5; 14 of 1915 (E.S.), § 3; 109
of 1918, § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 7368].
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destroyed eleven miles of levee on the East Bank of the Missis-
sippi River between Bayou La Moque and Ostrica Canal.2
The navigation locks constructed by the old Department of
Conservation in the Main Line Mississippi River Levee near Em-
pire, under the provisions of Act 108 of 1944, have been placed,
along with all other navigation locks, under the supervision of
the Department of Public Works, which is charged with main-
taining and operating them.3
Pilots
The law relative to pilots is somewhat confused owing prin-
cipally to inconsistent legislation which has been enacted since
1880. In the Port of New Orleans, there are two pilot organiza-
tions, the River Port Pilots, who operate between Pilot Town
and New Orleans, and the New Orleans Bar Pilots, operating
from Pilot Town out to sea. The statutes governing these two
sets of pilots are so obscure, however, that it is difficult to ascer-
tain which provisions apply to each.
Act 99 of 1880 was "an act to regulate the system of pilotage
of the ports of the state," but applied by its own terminology to
pilots serving the entrances to the Mississippi, as well as to pilots
serving the other entrances, ports or passes in the sea coast. It
provided for the appointment by the governor of pilots recom-
mended to him by "the board of examiners," but made no pro-
vision for the establishment of such board. The subsequent
amendments to this act in 1890 and 1894 supplied this deficiency
by providing for the establishment of a board of three examiners
who were to examine and recommend applicants for appoint-
ment as pilots for "Calcasieu Bar, Pass, and River." This board,
being the only one in existence at that time, had, no doubt, juris-
diction over all other pilots to be appointed for all the other en-
trances to the Mississippi as well as the. other passes and ports
along the coast, even after the amendment of 1910, relative to
the qualification of pilots for the entrances to the Mississippi
River.4
In 1908, however, the body known as the "River Port Pilots
of New Orleans" was established to operate between Pilot Town
and the Port of New Orleans.' A board of river port pilot com-
2. La. Act 45 of 1946.
3. La. Act 34 of 1946.
4. La. Act 99 of 1880, § 2, as last amended by La. Act 26 of 1910, § 1
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 91411.
5. La. Act 54 of 1908 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9154 et seq.].
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missioners was also created, which at the same time was autho-
rized to act as a board of examiners and make recommendation
for the appointment of pilots to operate between Pilot Town
and New Orleans.
Still another act was passed in 1928 establishing a board of
three examiners "who shall compose the board of river port pilot
commissioners and examiners" with jurisdiction over all "river
pilots within their localities in all navigable streams ... includ-
ing intercoastal canals, Calcasieu and Sabine Rivers, bars and
passes, as likewise in all other navigable rivers and streams in
the State" but excluding the "Port of New Orleans and its pilot-
age jurisdiction on the Mississippi River." 6
Did this 1928 statute bring within the jurisdiction of the
board created thereby the bar pilots of New Orleans? It must be
noted that the act merely excepted from its provisions pilots of
the Port of New Orleans on the Mississippi River. Did the new
act abolish the board of examiners established by the amendments
to the statute of 1880? And did the 1928 legislation, which is all-
inclusive, supersede the provisions of the Revised Statutes of 1870
relative to the appointment, qualification and removal of pilots
throughout the state? 7
These are but few of the questions which arise by reason of
the indefiniteness of this legislation. The 1946 statutes on this
subject do clarify the situation to a limited extent. Particularly
is this true with reference to Act 278 of 1946 which amends Sec-
tion 2 of the original Act 99 of 1880. This amendment makes it
clear that the section, at least, is to apply to the pilots to the en-
trances of the Mississippi River, including pilots "on any other
inland waterway connecting the port of New Orleans with the
Gulf of Mexico or other outside waters."
The act of 1908, creating the River Port Pilots of New Or-
leans, as well as the 1928 statute, were also amended, but only
with regard to the fees which they are entitled to charge.8 The
confusion regarding the application of these different measures
to the different bodies of pilots is still present, and makes it evi-
dent that clarifying legislation should be enacted at an early date.
6. La. Act 198 of 1928 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9146 et seq.].
7. See La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 2686 et seq. [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9129 et
seq.] and La. Rev. Stats. of 1870, § 2712 et seq. [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9175
et seq.].
8. La. Acts 98 and 51 of 1946.
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PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
The trend in recent legislation toward the establishment of
pensions and retirement benefits of state public employees con-
tinues, as is evidenced by the numerous statutes adopted at the
1946 session of the legislature.
Act 124 of 1946 is an enabling statute for a constitutional
amendment which would authorize the legislature to establish
a retirement system for public school bus drivers, janitors, cus-
todians and other maintenance employees.' The act will not be
effective, however, until, and unless, the proposed amendment is
adopted. Even then, operations under the system are not to begin
until July 1, 1947.
Similarly, Act 126 of 1946 is the corresponding enabling le-
gislation for a constitutional amendment authorizing the estab-
lishment of a pension and retirement system for the aged and
incapacitated state employees, including the employees of dock
boards, boards of commissioners, levee and drainage districts and
state hospitals.2 The amendment, if adopted, will ratify the pres-
ent legislation; but the system will not go into operation until
July 1, 1947.
Amendments to existing statutes included Act 62 of 1946
which repeals Section 18 of Act 359 of 1938, an act providing for
assistance to the aged and needy blind. The repealed section re-
quired the recipient of assistance to notify the proper authorities
of any acquisition of property in excess of the amount stated in
his application. Upon the death of any recipient, the total amount
of assistance paid was allowed as a claim against the estate of
the decedent, after reasonable funeral expenses had been paid,
and the Federal Government was entitled to one-half of any
amount collected from the estate of the deceased. On the other
hand, however, Act 63 of 1946, which appears as an independent
statute, re-enacts some of the provisions of the repealed portions
of the 1938 statute, by providing that all recipients of old age
assistance, and aid to the needy blind, as well as recipients of aid
to dependent children or other assistance granted by the state,
must report to the Department of Public Welfare the receipt or
acquisition of any property or income in excess of the amount
stated in their application for assistance. Failure to do so is a
1. La. Act 394 of 1946, proposing an amendment to La. Const. of 1921,
Art. XII, § 23.
2. La. Act 410 of 1946, proposing an amendment to Art. XVIII of the
Constitution of 1921, by adding a new section thereto, to be numbered Sec-
tion 8.
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misdemeanor punishable by fine of not more than five hundred
dollars and not more than six months' imprisonment.
Act 12 of 1940, which provided for a firemen's pension and
relief system for the City of Alexandria, has been amended by
providing for increased employee contributions. A new provision
was also added which authorizes the City of Alexandria to ap-
propriate to the fund twenty-five per cent of the proceeds col-
lected by it from the operation of parking meters; in addition,
the city was authorized to pay into the fund, from the general
alimony tax, such sums as are necessary to make up any deficit
that may appear from the operations of any year. As originally
enacted, firemen who were disabled from causes other than those
arising out of their employment could collect compensation at
the rate of fifty per cent of their regular monthly salary, which
benefits were to terminate when other employment was secured.'
As now amended, compensation is payable for injuries arising
out of or in the course of employment and no limitation is made
as to the amounts payable. In addition the amendment estab-
lishes a maximum of benefits payable per month, and provides
that the fact that a beneficiary has burial insurance is not a bar
to recovery of burial expenses.
The firemen's pension statute for the City of Lake Charles5
was also amended to authorize the city to pay into the relief fund
all the amounts received by it as rebates, regardless of amount,
on fire insurance premiums of foreign companies.6
The general statute7 authorizing municipalities between fifty
thousand and two hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants to es-
tablish local pension systems for their police departments was
amended by Act 37 of 1946. The amendments include a provision
making the widowed mother of a member receiving retirement
compensation eligible for dependency benefits; municipalities
may now appropriate out of their general alimony fund such
sums as are necessary to make up any deficiency in the relief
fund; assessments against members have been raised from one
to two per cent; and the age for dependent children has been
raised to seventeen years.
Act 249 of 1946 amends the State Police Retirement System
3. La. Act. 12 of 1940, § 9 (5), as added by La. Act 4 of 1946.
4. Id. at § 13, as amended by La. Act 4 of 1946.
5. La. Act 186 of 1944.
6. La Act 186 of 1944, § 9 (3), amended by La. Act 79 of 1946.
7. La. Act 343 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 5688 et seq.].
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Act of 1944,8 by providing for the reinstatement of members who
served in the armed forces upon payment of current and past
due contributions.
In addition to the foregoing, a new statute authorizing the
parishes throughout the state to establish pension and relief sys-
tems for sheriffs and deputy sheriffs was adopted,9 and the City
of Baton Rouge has been authorized to create a system to pen-
sion and retire city firemen. 10
Only brief mention is needed of other acts affecting the pres-
ent topic. Act 119 of 1944, which authorizes municipalities in
excess of one hundred thousand inhabitants to adopt ordinances
establishing pension systems for all appointive officers and em-
ployees, has been made applicable to municipalities of ninety
thousand inhabitants and over;1 1 the statute authorizing the es-
tablishment of a firemen's pension system for the City of Monroe
has been repealed and rewritten;1 2 the teachers' retirement sys-
tem law for the Parish of Orleans 13 has been redrafted;14 and a
new statute creating a retirement system for the unskilled em-
ployees of the Orleans Parish School Board was adopted.1 5
iPROFESSIONS AND OCCUPATIONS
Cosmetic Therapy
Beauticians wishing to qualify as teachers in the practice of
the profession will have to meet higher standards under the pro-
visions of Act 228 of 1946 which now requires them to be gradu-
ates of an approved high school, to have completed the curricu-
lum of the teacher's training course under the supervision of a
licensed teacher, and to have passed a qualifying examination
given under the supervision of the board of cosmetic therapy.'
General Contractors
Act 223 of 1946 amends the general contracting statute2 to
permit contractors delinquent in their payment of fees to be re-
8. La. Act 136 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 9307.40 et seq.].
9. La. Act 327 of 1946.
10. La. Act 299 of 1946.
11. La. Act 259 of 1946.
12. La. Act 28 of 1946, repea 4 ng La. Act 180 of 1940.
13. La. Act 116 of 1910, as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2405 et seq.].
14. La. Act 287 of 1946.
15. La. Act 282 of 1946.
1. Formerly an operator could be licensed as a manager or teacher after
serving two years under the supervision of a licensed manager. La. Act 135
of 1924, § 3, as amended by La. Act 149 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (S-opp. 1946)
§ 9485].
2. La. Act 397 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9583.19 et seq.].
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instated and have their licenses renewed without further ex-
amination upon payment of the current fees.
Civil Engineering
Act 43 of 1946 exempts from compliance with the civil en-
gineering act 3 employees of the state or of any of its political
subdivisions who are presently engaged in the practice of the
profession and employed as such by the state.
Notaries Public
Since 1890, the number of notaries for the Parish of Orleans
has been periodically increased until 1942 when the number was
increased to seven hundred and twenty-five.4 Act 265 of 1946 has
further increased this figure to eight hundred and twenty-five.
Applicants for notarial commissions in the Parish of Or-
leans were required to pass an examination before the supreme
court and receive a certificate of competency signed by at least
three judges thereof.5 Under Act 381 of 1946, this examination
is to be held in the Civil District Court, and the certificate signed
by three of the judges thereof. It is also provided that the court
may appoint a committee of lawyers to conduct the examination,
and that the examination may be dispensed with in cases where
the applicant is an attorney, duly admitted to practice and main-
taining an office in the City of New Orleans.
Act 32 of 1942 provides for all acts executed in a foreign
country by members of the armed forces before an officer of the
United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, and
two attesting witnesses to have the effect of authentic acts exe-
cuted in Louisiana.' Act 253 of 1946 does not purport to amend
this 1942 statute, but it does, in effect supersede it by providing
that all acts executed before an officer of the United States Army,
Navy, or Marine Corps are to be admissible in evidence as having
been properly executed, if made "in accordance with any of the
various statutes of the United States" whether the instruments
are executed in a foreign country, on the high seas or in the
United States or territories thereof.
3. La. Act 308 of 1908 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 9544 et seq.].
4. La. Act 42 of 1890, §§ 4, 5, as last amended by La. Act 230 of 1942 [Dart's
Stats. (Supp. 1946) §§ 6307, 6308].
5. La. Act 42 of 1890, § 7 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 6310].
6. La. Act 32 of 1942, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 6289.1].
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REVENUE AND TAXATION
In General
Act 75 of 1946. Under the provisions of Act 237 of 1924 rela-
tive to the judicial sale of property for nonpayment of taxes, the
sheriff making and executing the sale was entitled to a commis-
sion of two per cent of the amount bid and paid, provided it did
not exceed twenty-five dollars per day in any one day's adjudi-
cations. This act increases the commission to four per cent; it
places no limit on the commissions which may be earned in any
one day, and, in addition the sheriff is entitled to charge fifteen
dollars for each act of sale executed by him, to be paid by the
adjudicatee of the property.
Act 182 of 1946. A comprehensive statute relative to the col-
lection of taxes due to the state was enacted in 1940. Section 15
provided for refunds of overpayments or of payments where no
tax was due. The collector was authorized to credit the whole
amount or any portion thereof to any other tax liability of the
taxpayer and, if it was determined that no other taxes were due,
the department was authorized to make a refund. Section 16 of
the statute provided that no refunds or credits should be made
after three years from the thirty-first day of December of the
year in which the tax became due, or after one year from the
date the tax was paid, whichever was later. Both these provisions
have been repealed, so that the remedy now available to tax-
payers for the recovery of taxes erroneously paid into the
treasury is that provided by Act 120 of 1942,1 creating the Board
of Tax Appeals, the functions of which are to examine into the
justice, merit and correctness of all such claims, and to make
recommendations for the payment thereof.
Act 328 of 1946. This act requires all tax assessors for the
different parishes (except the assessor for the Parish of Orleans)
to complete and file the tax rolls of their respective parishes by
the fifteenth day of November of each year, beginning in 1946.
The act further requires the officer having custody of the asses-
sors' salary and expense fund to withhold from the salary of the
assessor who is in default the sum of five dollars for each day
of delay.
Act 27 of 1946. The funds authorized to each parish for
clerical and other expenses of tax assessors were considerably in-
1. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 6654 et seq.
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creased by this act. Most increases ranged from one to two thou-
sand dollars, but in a few instances the increases were quite sub-
stantial.2
Banks and Banking
Act 7 of 1946. This act provides for a tax to be levied on shares
of bank stock based upon a percentum of the assessed valuation
thereof. At the outset, it is significant that this is not a specific
amendment to the existing legislation on the subject, but pur-
ports to be an independent statute. It incorporates earlier provi-
sions relative to the taxing of bank shares, and specifically repeals
all previous statutes.8
While the act is a consolidation of the law on taxation of bank
shares, its primary purpose is to effect a reduction of the tax, not
by granting specific exemptions, but by reducing the basis to a
percentum thereof. It provides, in brief, that for the purposes of
the tax, the shares of stock in Federal Joint Stock Land Banks
are to be assessed at ten per cent of their valuation,4 while in the
case of national banks the shares are to be assessed at fifty per
cent of their value.
The original statutes provided that the basis for arriving at
the value of the shares of stock in any bank was the sum of the
capital stock, plus the surplus and undivided profits, as ascer-
tained by the statements required to be furnished by the officers
of the particular institution." In 1938, the legislature passed Act
172, amending the original provisions, whereby a reduction of
the tax was to be accomplished by providing that, in valuing the
shares for the purposes of the tax, only the excess surplus, undi-
vided profits and contingent reserves, over and above the par
value of the capital stock was to be added to it.7 Thus, whereas
prior to the 1938 statute, the whole of the declared surplus, un-
divided profits and contingent reserves were included in fixing
the value of the shares to be taxed, only the excess thereof over
and above the value of the capital stock was to be included. The
4. This provision is taken from Act 116 of 1922 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §
684].
5. La. Act 14 of 1917 (E. S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 684 et seq.].
6. Id. at § 4 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 687].
7. La. Act 172 of 1938, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 687].
3. See La. Act 14 of 1917 (E. S.) as amended by La. Act 116 of 1922, La.
Act 221 of 1928, La. Act 6 of 1934 and La. Act 172 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939)
§ 684 et seq.]. La. Act 116 of 1922, though not specifically repealed by Act 7
of 1946, is automatically replaced by the provisions thereof.
2. East Baton Rouge Parish was granted an increase of $20,000.00; Caddo
Parish was granted an increase of $12,000.00; Ouachita Parish was granted
an additional $5,500.00 and Lafourche Parish an additional $4,000.00.
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1938 amendment, however, was declared unconstitutional on the
grounds that it in effect granted an exemption not authorized by
the Constitution, thus refuting the contention on behalf of the
plaintiffs that it merely provided for a method of arriving at the
valuation of the shares for tax purposes.8
Act 7 of 1946 establishes the basis for arriving at the valua-
tion of the shares by providing that such valuation is to be the
value of the declared capital stock, plus surplus and undivided
profits, as shown by the statements of the bank, thus adopting
the same standard first imposed by the original statute. But, as
pointed out above, the statute further provides that the tax is to
be paid only on ten per cent of the valuation in the case of Fed-
eral Joint Stock Land Banks and on fifty per cent in the case of
national banks. Is such a provision countenanced by the Consti-
tution? Is this not in effect granting an exemption in violation
of the constitutional prohibition and within the teeth of the su-
preme court decision holding the 1938 amendment unconstitu-
tional?9
Although there seems to be ample precedent for the enact-
ment of taxing provisions based upon a percentum of valuation,l0
the supreme court has at least indicated that such provisions
8. "To maintain that an exemption resulting from a formula or a mode
for the assessment valuation or the computation of the tax is not an ex-
emption would be, in effect, holding that the exemption clause of the Con-
stitution above referred to places no limitation upon the power and au-
thority of the Legislature to exempt property from taxation. In short, if
this method of legislative procedure were sanctioned by the courts, the con-
stitutional prohibition against exemptions would be in practical operation
eliminated from the Constitution. This result we cannot countenance, be-
cause it would be contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the constitu-
tional provision in question .. " Hibernia Nat. Bank v. Louisiana Tax
Commission, 195 La. 43, 65, 196 So. 15, 22 (1940).
In this connection see also State v. Union Building Corporation, 185 La.
598, 170 So. 7 (1936); State v. Union Mayer Sugar & Molasses Co., 204 La.
742, 16 So. (2d) 251 (1943) holding that the provisions of the corporation
franchise tax act, If Interpreted to exclude from taxation the borrowed
capital of the corporation only to the extent that it exceeded the sum of
capital stock, surplus and undivided profits would render it unconstitutional.
See discussion on page 94, infra.
9. In this connection it is interesting that the proponents of Act 172 of
1938 attempted to incorporate its provisions in the constitution by subse-
quently proposing a constitutional amendment (See La. Act 389 of 1940) as
well as an enabling act (See Act 260 of 1940) to become effective on the
adoption of the constitution. Needless to say the amendment failed to re-
ceive the approval of the electorate.
10. Cf. La. Act 116 of 1922, providing for a tax on 10 per cent of assessed
value on shares of Federal Joint Stock Land Banks; La. Act 142 of 1926
[Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8377], providing for assessment of property of ship
repair plants at 40 per cent of actual value for tax purposes; and La. Act
208 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8380.2] providing for assessment of prop-
erty used in manufacture of tung oil at 10 per cent of actual value for tax
purposes.
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would also be violative of the constitutional prohibition as being
a disguised exemption,1 ' and it is apparent that, under the guise
of classification by reduction of the assessment value, ample op-
portunity is afforded for securing exemptions from taxation on
property otherwise taxable in its entirety. It may well be that
the present statute is fraught with the same objections which
made the 1938 act unconstitutional.
Corporations
Act 201 of 1946. The Corporation Franchise Tax Act of 1935"1
levied a tax on domestic and foreign corporations, and except for
certain necessary differences in the manner of ascertaining the
assets within the state for the purposes of computing the tax,
both domestic and foreign corporations were taxed alike at the
rate of two dollars per one thousand dollars of capital stock,
surplus and undivided profits. It was further provided that, if
the capital used or invested in the business included borrowed
capital in excess of capital stock, surplus and undivided profits,
such excess of borrowed capital was to be added to the capital
stock, surplus and undivided profits, as a part thereof. Thus, ac-
cording to the act, corporations were required to pay a tax of
two dollars per one thousand dollars of capital stock, surplus and
undivided profits, and two dollars per one thousand dollars of
borrowed capital, but only to the extent that the amount of the
borrowed capital exceeded the total amount of capital stock,
surplus and undivided profits.
Nevertheless, and in spite of the clear and concise language
of this act, our supreme court held that the total amount of bor-
rowed capital should be included in the tax base.13 The court
based its decision on the ground that, to interpret the statute as
merely taxing borrowed capital to the extent it exceeded the
amount of capital stock, surplus and undivided profits would
render the statute discriminatory and consequently unconstitu-
11. "The plaintiffs contend that the method of taxing the shares of stock,
instead of the property of corporations engaged in the banking business,
discriminates against them because the Legislature, by Act 163 of 1924, un-
dertook to require that the bonds of any of the states, or of any of their
political subdivisions . . . not exempt from taxation should be assessed at
10 per cent. of their market value. The statute is so palpably violative of
the constitutional requirement that all property that is subject to taxation
shall be assessed at its actual cash value, that it has never been enforced."
First National Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 175 La. 119, 139, 143 So.
23, 29 (1932).
12. La. Act 10 of 1935 (1 E. S.) [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8722 et seq.].
13. State v. Union Building Corporation. 185 La. 598, 170 So. 7 (1936).
See also State v. Xcter Realty Co. Ltd., 182 La. 414, 162 So. 29 (1935).
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tional.14 In a later decision 15 the constitutionality of the statute
was again questioned, but the court adhered to its former deci-
sion. The 1946 amendment follows the court's interpretation of
the statute so that the provision in question now requires the
tax to be paid on the "outstanding capital stock, surplus, undi-
vided profits and borrowed capital"'' 6 and at the same time re-
duces the tax rate to a dollar and fifty cents per thousand.
Regarding the distribution of the proceeds of the tax, the
act provided for the payment to the Board of Supervisors of Lou-
isiana State University one-quarter of the annual collections, in
addition to the unused and unexpended portion of the one-quar-
ter of the tax allocated to the State Board of Education.' This
portion of the act has been amended so as to allocate to the uni-
versity the remainder of the tax after all other disbursements
have been made, not to exceed $1,217,000.00 per annum.
Act 85 of 1946. Regarding the distribution of the proceeds of
the chain store tax, it was formerly provided that all taxes col-
lected should be paid into the Department of Revenue to be dis-
bursed and apportioned to the various parishes of the state where-
in the stores were located, based pro rata upon the population of
each parish. 8 Act 85 of 1946 amends these provisions so that the
tax is now prorated among the various municipalities, except
where the stores are located outside municipal corporate limits,
in which case the tax is allocable to the parishes wherein the
stores are located.' 9
Motor Fuel
Acts 183 and 184 of 1946. Act 183 exempts from the two cents
motor fuel tax imposed by Act 87 of 193600 the product commonly
known as Farm Tractor Fuel, whether the same is sold for use
14. "If this interpretation be correct, it is readily seen that the act is
discriminatory in that the tax levied might be unequal on corporations of
the same class engaged In the same kind of business." State v. Union Build-
ing Corporation, 185 La. 598, 613, 170 So. 7, 12 (1936). Cf. Hibernia National
Bank v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 195 La. 43, 196 So. 15 (1940), where a
similar statute was declared unconstitutional.
15. State v. Union Mayer Sugar & Molasses Co., 204 La. 742, 16 So.(2d)
251 (1943).
16. La. Act 10 of 1935 (1 E. S.) § 4, as last amended by La. Act 201 of 1946.
17. La. Act 10 of 1935 (1 E. S.), § 11, as amended by La. Act 12 of 1942
(E. S.) [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8732]. Note that the 1946 statute has
effected a change in the numerical order of the sections, the original Section
11 of the 1935 statute being now Section 10.
18. La. Act 19 of 1932, § 6 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8669].
19. This amendment did not become effective until October 1, 1946.
20. La. Act 87 of 1936, § 1, as amended by La. Act 68 of 1944 [Dart's
Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8835.14].
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exclusively for farm purposes or not. A similar exemption is
made by Act 184 with respect to the four cents tax imposed by
Act 6 of 1928 (E.S.) .21 Formerly, this fuel was exempt only when
used exclusively for farm purposes.
Act 18 of 1946. Act 15 of 1934 (3 E.S.) 22 imposing an occupa-
tional license tax on wholesale and retail distributors of gasoline
has been amended to provide that, in calculating the gross sales
which form the basis for determining the amount of the license
tax, they are entitled to deduct therefrom that part of the pur-
chase price of the product which represents federal and state
taxes.
Act 283 of 1946. The two cents gasoline tax statute of 193628
provided for the disposition of the proceeds of the tax as follows:
One-half to be credited to the general highway fund and one-half
to be placed in a special fund to be distributed by the treasurer to
the different parishes and to the City of New Orleans to be used
by them for the construction of roads and bridges in the parishes,
and streets and bridges in the City of New Orleans, "and for
other public purposes. "24 Act 283 of 1946 amends the above pro-
visions by restricting the purposes for which the tax may be
used by the parishes and the City of New Orleans to the con-
struction of roads, streets and bridges only.
In connection with the act, it is to be observed that it pro-
vides that the proceeds placed to the credit of the special fund
are to be apportioned, allocated and disbursed to the parishes
and the City of New Orleans "in the same proportion that the
gasoline tax heretofore collected under Act 87 of 1936, as origi-
nally enacted, was apportioned and paid to the parishes and the
City of New Orleans. 25
Section 5 of the original act prorated the tax on the basis of
the total tax collected in each parish. Act 19 of 1938, which first
amended this section, excluded therefrom the language specify-
ing the manner in which the proration should be made, but pro-
vided instead that the distribution should be made "in the same
proportion that the gasoline tax heretofore collected under Act
87 of 1936 was apportioned and paid," thus following the method
contained in the section as originally adopted, but which was
21. La. Act 6 of 1928 (E. S.), § 1, as last amended by La. Act 69 of 1944
[Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8806].
22. La. Act 15 of 1934 (3 E. S.), § 8, as amended by La. Act 175 of 1944
[Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8595].
23. La. Act 87 of 1936, § 5 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8835.18].
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., as last amended by La. Act 283 of 1946.
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repealed by the amendatory statute itself. In all subsequent
amendments the same reference has been made26 with the result
that, as presently enacted, the distribution is to be governed by
a provision of the statute which no longer exists as such, having
been repealed by the first amendatory act of 1938. This raises the
question as to whether a repealed statute may be adopted or
revived by a mere reference thereto. As the statute now reads,
the proceeds of the two cents tax is to be allocated to the par-
ishes, but nowhere in the "live" portions of the law is there pro-
vided the method to be used for making this allocation nor for
effecting an equitable distribution thereof, except by reference
to a repealed portion of the act, which is the very thing which
the Constitution prohibits.
27
A similar question was presented in the case of Airey v. Tug-
well,25 wherein an act which purported to convey to a levee dis-
trict certain lands "according to all the terms and provisions of
the relative granting statutes" was held unconstitutional, since
the statutes referred to had been previously repealed. 29  Al-
though it is unlikely that any litigation may arise in connection
with this statute, the necessity for an amendment curing this
defect is apparent, and it is hoped the matter will be brought to
the attention of the legislature at its next regular session.
Severance of Natural Resources
Act 202 of 1946. Section 2 (8-g) of Act 24 of 1935 (2 E. S.)3 0
provided for a severance tax of one cent per barrel of forty-two
gallons on natural gasoline and casinghead gas, subject to a credit
of one cent per barrel of the license tax imposed upon the manu-
26. See La. Act 141 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8838.18]; La. Act
176 of 1942.
27. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 17.
28. Airey v. Tugwell, 197 La. 982, 3 So.(2d) 99 (1941).
29. "The phrase 'relative granting statutes' refers, of course, to section
11, Act 18 of 1894, which section ... was repealed by Act 237 of 1924 ...
[The statute] directs that the lands be conveyed to the Levee District 'ac-
cording to all the terms and provisions of the relative granting statutes'
.... If that law was not revived or amended by Act 324 of 1938 . . . the
Register of the State Land Office had no authority to make the transfer.
But the old repealed law was not revived or amended. . . . 'There can be
no doubt that under our constitution no law can be re-enacted merely by
reference and that the re-enactment of a repealed law by reference is pro-
hibited.'" Airey v. Tugwell, 197 La. 982, 994, 3 So.(2d) 99, 103 (1941).
La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 17: "No law shall be revived or amended
by reference to its title, but in such cases the act revived, or section amend-
ed, shall be re-enacted and published at length." See also La. Const. of 1921,
Art. III, § 18; State v. Whitaker, 152 La. 639, 94 So. 144 (1922); Rathbone v.
Collector of Revenue, 196 La. 795, 200 So. 149 (1941). Cf. Campagna v. City of
Baton Rouge, 165 La. 974, 116 So. 403 (1928).
30. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8523.
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facturers, distillers and refiners of petroleum and petroleum pro-
ducts.8 1 This section has been amended to omit therefrom the
provisions granting the credit, so that the taxpayer is no longer
entitled to deduct taxes paid under the occupational license tax
law. Section 2 (9)82 was also amended by this act. As originally
worded, it imposed a severance tax of three-tenths of one cent
per 1000 cubic feet on natural gas, but it provided that in deter-
mining the quantity of gas for the purpose of the tax "gas in-
jected into the earth of the State of Louisiana" was to be ex-
cluded, as well as gas produced from oil wells and flared or vent-
ed directly into the atmosphere. The 1946 amendment provides
that the tax is to be paid on all gas produced, except gas which
of necessity has to be flared into the atmosphere in the production
of oil, and gas which is subsequently restored to the formation
of the earth. Gas, however, injected into the earth for the pur-
pose of producing oil by the method known as the "gas lift
method" is to be taxed at the same rate as if produced for com-
mercial purposes. As the statute was formerly worded, gas in-
jected into the earth was exempted from the tax, and no distinc-
tion was made whether the gas was injected for restoration pur-
poses, or for the purpose of producing oil with the aid thereof.
The intention of the legislature has been clarified by the present
statute, the evident purpose being to tax all gas produced, ex-
cept that which is subsequently restored or that which is neces-
sarily wasted.
Inheritance
The Louisiana Inheritance Tax Law3" provides for the ap-
pointment of attorneys for the inheritance tax collectors in the
different parishes to assist them in the collection of the taxes.
The compensation of these attorneys was fixed by the statute at
four per cent on all taxes collected monthly up to one hundred
and fifty thousand dollars, and two per cent on amounts in excess
thereof. While the compensation of these attorneys remains the
same in all other parishes, Act 242 of 1946 reduces the compensa-
tion of the attorney for the tax collector of the Parish of Orleans
to two per cent on the first one hundred and fifty thousand dol-
lars, and one per cent on amounts in excess thereof.
31. La. Act 15 of 1934 (3 E. S.), § 41, as last amended by La. Act 125 of
1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8629.1].
32. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8523.
33. La. Act 127 of 1921, § 22 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8577].
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Income
Four statutes were passed amending different sections of the
income tax statute;34 and although there was some duplication
in the amendatory measures, there were fortunately no conflict-
ing provisions. Taken together, several significant changes were
effected, particularly regarding the provisions for deductions
from gross and net income.
Act 195 of 1946. As last amended by Act 158 of 1944,35 Sec-
tion 32 of the statute defined "dividends" paid by corporations
for the purposes of the tax as any distribution made to share-
holders, whether in money or in other property "out of [their]
earnings or profits." This term has been redefined to mean any
distribution made, whether in money or in other property, out
of earnings or profits "accrued since December 31, 1933." The
purpose of this amendment is evidently to exclude from taxation
dividends paid from profits earned prior to the passage of the
original statute and to resolve in favor of the taxpayer a possible
doubt as to whether a tax could be imposed retroactively on
dividends derived from property acquired prior to the effective
date of the act86
Act 191 of 1946. As already stated' this act amended Sec-
tions 11 and 26 of the income tax statute, but since its provisions
are duplicated in the other amendatory acts, it is unnecessary
to discuss it further under this heading.
Act 200 of 1946. In general, gross income, for the purposes of
the act includes gains, profits and income derived from salaries,
wages or compensation for personal services or from professions
or occupations, or growing out of the ownership of property. Ex-
cluded from gross income are certain items such as amounts re-
ceived from insurance policies, values acquired by donations or
by inheritance, liability insurance benefits and interest on obliga-
tions of the state 8 To the list of items to be excluded from gross
income has been added capital gains which are defined as gains
from the sales or exchanges of capital assets located outside the
state.3 9 Correlatively, capital losses from sales or exchanges of
34. La. Act 21 of 1934 as amended [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8587.1 et seq.].
35. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 32, as last amended by La. Act 158 of 1944 [Dart's
Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8587.32].
36. Trefry v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 552, 116 N.E. 904 (1917).
37. Supra p. 27, n. 20.
38. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 8, as last amended by La. Act 146 of 1944 [Dart's
Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8587.8].
39. Ibid., as last amended by La. Act 200 of 1946.
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capital assets located outside the state are not deductible from
net income. 0
Act 203 of 1946. Section 9 of the Income Tax Act41 permits
certain deductions to be made from gross income for the de-
termination of the net taxable income. To this list has been added
a provision designed to exempt from taxation the amount of in-
come taxes paid in other states.4 2 Among the items deductible
were charitable donations up to fifteen per cent of the taxpayers
net income, computed without benefit of the exemption, but no
distinction was made between individuals and corporations. The
maximum allowed as a deduction for charitable donations under
the 1946 statute has been reduced, with respect to corporations,
to five per cent of the net income. 8
In addition to the personal exemptions of one thousand dol-
lars and twenty-five hundred dollars in favor of single and mar-
ried persons, respectively, the statute now grants an additional
exemption in favor of veterans of fifteen hundred dollars if single
and of twenty-five hundred dollars if married.44 Thus, the total
exemption given to war veterans is twenty-five hundred dollars
if single, and five thousand dollars if married and living with hus-
band or wife. These additional exemptions, however, are for a
limited period of five years.
The provisions permitting credits for educational expenses
formerly extended to expenses furnished to persons "under the
age of 21 years.'4 5 These provisions have been amended so as to
restrict the credit to expenses furnished to persons between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-one years.6 The credit allowed for
dependents was not changed but a new provision has been added
the effect of which is to reduce this exemption by four hundred
dollars in the case of a head of a family other than a married
person living with husband or wife. It is provided that in the
case of a head of a family who is such only by reason of having
40. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 10 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8587.10], as last
amended by La. Acts 200 and 203 of 1946.
41. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 9, as last amended by La. Act 205 of 1944 [Dart's
Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8587.9].
42. Ibid., as last amended by La. Act 203 of 1946.
43. The amount remains unchanged with respect to individuals, except
that if in the taxable year and in each of the eight preceding taxable years
the contributions of an individual taxpayer, plus the amount of income taxes
paid exceed 90 per cent of his net income for each taxable year, then the 15
per cent limit imposed is not to be applied.
44. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 11 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8587.11], as last
amended by La. Acts 191 and 203 of 1946.
45. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 11 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8587.11], as last
amended by La. Act 158 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8587.11].
46. Ibid., as last amended by La. Acts 191 and 203 of 1946.
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one or more dependents for whom he would be entitled to the
dependency credit of four hundred dollars or the educational
expense credit, the credit will be disallowed with respect to one
of such dependents.' 7
Domestic corporations as well as individuals have been
granted a further credit against income taxes paid in other states
on income taxable under its laws, regardless of the domicile of
the taxpayer, except in cases where a reciprocal law exists in
the state to which the tax has been paid.4 8
Of the above innovations injected into the income tax sta-
tute, only the one pertaining to the special exemptions in favor
of veterans appears questionable under the Constitution. The
Constitution permits the levy of taxes on net incomes, but it spe-
cifically provides that these must be equal and uniform.49 Thus,
the inquiry is necessarily whether the exemption granted to vet-
erans results in unwarranted discrimination against all other
taxpayers similarly situated. It is the uniform rule of law that
constitutional requirements as to the equality and uniformity
of taxation do not inhibit the legislature from, nor do they de-
prive it of, the power of dividing the objects of taxation into
classes, provided always that the classification adopted is reason-
able and based on substantial differences. 50
As to whether or not veterans as such may be placed in a
special class for the purpose of exemption the courts are in dis-
agreement. Some jurisdictions prefer to hold that veterans may
be included as a class for the purpose of exemptions from taxa-
tion, the classification being not only reasonable but also sub-
stantial and warranted, 1 while others prefer to hold the classifi-
cation arbitrary and unreasonable.52  Thus, in considering the
validity of a statute exempting war veterans from payment of
47. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 11(4), as added by La. Act 203 of 1946.
48. La. Act 21 of 1934, § 11(6-a), as added by La. 203 of 1946.
49. La. Const. of 1921, Art. X, § 1.
50. City of New Orleans v. Kaufman, 29 La. Ann. 283, 29 Am. Rep. 328
(1877); City of New Orleans v. Davidson, 30 La. Ann. 554 (1878); City of New
Orleans v. Peoples' Bank, 32 La. Ann. 82 (1880); City of New Orleans v. Ken-
nard, 34 La. Ann. 851 (1882); Dooley v. Johnson, 133 Cal. App. 459, 24 P.(2d)
540 (1933); City of Macon v. Samples, 167 Ga. 150, 145 S.E. 57 (1928); State
v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 Pac. 771 (1923).
51. City of Macon v. Samples, 167 Ga. 150, 145 S. E. 57 (1928); Strauss
v. Borough of Bradley Beach, 117 N.J. L. 40, 186 Atl. 681 (1936); Farley v.
Watt, 165 Okla. 6, 23 P.(2d) 687 (1933); Harkin v. Board of Commissioners
of Niobrara County, 30 Wyo. 455, 22 Pac. 35 (1924).
52. State v. Garbroski, 111 Iowa 496, 82 N.W. 959 (1900); City o Laurens
v. Anderson, 75 S.C. 62, 55 S. E. 136 (1906); State v. Shedroi, 75 Vt. 277, 54
Atl. 1081 (1903).
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certain occupational license taxes, the Supreme Court of Georgia
said:
"And it does seem to us that the reasonableness of the classi-
fication here, based upon outstanding facts which characterized
the class created, is so manifest that it cannot even be doubted.
The men who are included in the class exempted by this sta-
tute were deemed subject to classification when the war in
which they served was on. They were classified for the pur-
pose of having them leave their business and their occupation,
and their property, and some of them their families, to go to
war and incur the hardships and dangers, and it is not unrea-
sonable to classify them now for the purpose of exempting
them from certain burdens of taxation....
So also, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated:
"The soldiers ...were selected from a particular class . ..
The government selected male citizens of a particular age ....
Those who were classified and called away were handicapped
not only by an interrupted preparation, but by a tremendous
inflation of values which met them upon their return. They
constituted a distinct class, distinguished from the mass of
society-a class created by deprivation of equal opportunity
in civil pursuits at home and marked by disability incident
to defense of their country abroad."' 4
And the Supreme Court of New Jersey:
"It has for many years been the custom of the state to recog-
nize veterans of our wars as men in a class distinct from the
mass of its citizens; a class which has rendered distinctive
service to the country, in many cases suffering injuries or
lasting disability.""
Despite the contrary decisions of other jurisdictions, it ap-
pears that the modern trend is toward holding that the classifi-
cation of veterans as such is not objectionable either as class or
discriminatory legislation. The fact that these exemptions are of
a temporary duration only is a favorable factor, should their con-
stitutionality be questioned in our courts.
53. City of Macon v. Samples, 167 Ga. 150, 155, 145 S. E. 57, 59 (1928).
54. Farley v. Watt, 165 Okla. 6, 7, 23 P.(2d) 687, 689 (1933).
55. Strauss v. Borough of Bradley Beach, 117 N. J. L. 45, 46, 186 Atl. 681
(1936).
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SALARY RAISES
Availing itself of the provisions of Article III, Section 34, of
the Constitution' the legislature raised the per diem of its own
members as well as the salaries of a great many state officers.'
In the majority of instances, the promulgated acts are noted as
having received the necessary two-thirds vote in each house; in
some instances, however, this notation is conspicuously absent,
although it does not necessarily follow that these acts failed to
receive the necessary votes.8
Act 294 of 1946. This statute authorizes the criminal sheriff
for the Parish of Orleans to appoint as many deputy sheriffs as
may be necessary not in excess of one hundred and fifteen, and
requires the City of New Orleans to pay them the salaries estab-
lished by the act. This statute has been attacked as unconstitu-
tional' on the grounds that it is an act to change the salaries of
public officers without the necessary two-thirds vote as required
by the Constitution. 5 A similar controversy arose concerning the
constitutionality of Act 108 of 1928 which set forth the salaries
and classifications of eighty-nine criminal deputy sheriffs for the
Parish of Orleans.' It was contended by the City of New Orleans
that the act "changed" the salaries of the deputies which were
fixed by the Constitution at "not less than one hundred dollars."7
The supreme court, however, held these salaries were not "fixed"
within the meaning of Article III, Section 34, because the Con-
stitution did not provide for a definite amount but merely stated
the minimum below which they could not fall; nor were they
fixed by statute, and consequently, the two-thirds vote was not
necessary for the validity of the act which, for the first time fixed
the salaries for the deputy criminal sheriffs for the Parish of Or-
leans." Act 108 of 1928, however, was repealed by Act 114 of 1932
1. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 34. "Salaries of public officers, whether
fixed in this Constitution or otherwise, may be changed by vote of two-thirds
of the members of each House of the Legislature." (Italics supplied.)
2. For an analysis of these statutes, see p. 25, n. 12.
3. Cf. Act 153, raising salary of city court judge of Monroe, which passed
by 71 votes in the House and 28 in the Senate; Act 213, raising salary of
clerks of court in East Feliciana which passed by 67 votes in the House and
26 in the Senate.
4. State ex rel. Grosh v. City of New Orleans, No. 271,029 on the docket
of the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans.
5. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 34.
6. State v. City of New Orleans, 171 La. 670, 131 So. 843 (1930).
7. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 88.
8. "As section 88 of Article 7 of the present Constitution did not 'fix,' in
the usual sense of that term, the salary of each of the deputies of the crimi-
nal sheriff for the parish of Orleans, it cannot be contended logically ...
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which in turn empowered the Commission Council of the City
of New Orleans to fix the salaries of the deputy criminal sheriffs
at not less than a certain percentage of the salaries fixed by the
act of 1928. Although Act 114 of 1932 was subsequently repealed,
its provisions are now embodied in Act 8 of 1940 (E. S.),9 and it
should follow that the salaries of the deputy criminal sheriffs of
New Orleans are not now fixed within the meaning of the consti-
tutional provisions above referred to, and that Act 204 of 1946
does not in effect "change" the salaries of the deputy criminal
sheriffs of New Orleans, but merely fixes them for the first time.1"
Act 94 of 1946. This act amends Section 10 of Act 114 of 1921
which established the salary of both the clerk and the stenog-
rapher of the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans.
Act 94 of 1946 increases these salaries but failed to obtain the
necessary two-thirds vote in the House.:" This would make it
clearly unconstitutional, for it could not be contended that this
was not a statute changing the salary of these officers, the avowed
purpose of the act being to amend the statute which fixed these
salaries, by increasing the same.
Aside from any other legal questions which may be pre-
sented in passing upon the constitutionality of salary raising
statutes, an important question is whether the vote required by
the Constitution is two-thirds of the elected members, or merely
two-thirds of the members present at the time the vote is taken.
The only time this question seems to have been presented for
consideration, the supreme court did not find it necessary to pass
upon it," but it is interesting to note that the legislature itself
that Act 108 of 1928 changed these salaries since they were fixed for the first
time by this act." State v. City of New Orleans, 171 La. 670, 674, 131 So. 843,
845 (1930). Explaining the meaning of Art. III, § 34, with respect to the words
"fixed in this Constitution or otherwise" the court said: "It is manifest that
the term 'fixed otherwise,' as used in the above section, means fixed by the
legislature or by statute, and cannot be extended to the salary of a deputy
sheriff fixed merely by the sheriff who has appointed him .... 171 La. 670,
675, 131 So. 843, 845 (1930).
9. La. Act 8 of 1940 (E. S.) [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 7480].
10. State v. City of New Orleans, 171 La. 670, 131 So. 843 (1930).
11. The official calendar of the House of Representatives for 1946 shows
it received only 60 affirmative votes.
12. This issue was squarely presented to the court in State v. City of
New Orleans, supra, but the court dismissed it as unnecessary for the de-
cision thus: "Hereafter, should there be an attempt to change the salaries
of the deputy criminal sheriffs for the parish of Orleans by amendment to
Act No. 108 of 1928, then there will be ample time and opportunity to con-
sider and dispose of the other issues raised by respondent in this case." 171
La. 670, 675, 131 So. 843, 845 (1930).
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considers the necessary vote to be two-thirds of the elected mem-
bers to each house.'8
Two other acts failing to receive the affirmative vote of the
elected members of both houses are Act 187, raising the salary
of the Judge of the City Court of Shreveport"' and Act 358, rais-
ing the compensation of the tax assessor for the Parish of Bos-
sier,' 5 which had been last established by the legislature in Act
97 of 1944.1e
STATE DEPARTMENTS, BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS
In General
All state agencies, departments, boards and commissions,
must now pay rent on space occupied by them in buildings owned
or maintained by the state. The director of finance is authorized
to assess and collect this rent on a current rental basis, and all
rental revenues must be deposited in the state treasury to the
credit of the general fund.'
Advertising
Act 13 of the Extraordinary Session of 1940, made it unlaw-
ful for the state, or any department, board or commission thereof
to expend any public funds for public advertising except for bids
for public works, supplies or for the sale of bonds. Act 232 of
1946 has amended this statute so as to permit educational insti-
tutions to advertise freely extension courses offered by them as
well as publications and other materials offered for sale. Espe-
cially benefited by this amendment is the Louisiana State Uni-
versity Press which was heretofore unable to properly advertise
its publications among the booksellers and the general public.
This amendment places the University Press on an equal footing
13. The following note appears in the calendar of the House for the
year 1938 upon the voting on S.B. 65, raising the salaries of the judges of
district courts: ". . . June 8, read third time in full, roll call on final pas-
sage, yeas 74, nays 0, the bill, having received a two-thirds vote of the mem-
bers elect was finally passed, title adopted, ordered to Senate." (Italics sup-
plied.) In 1926 the legislature passed Act 59, raising the salaries of state of-
ficials. The House Journal for that year contains a note to the effect that
the original bill, falling to obtain the required two-thirds vote of the elected
membership, had been defeated. On reconsideration, the bill passed with
the necessary 67 votes.
14. The official calendars show the bill obtained 70 affirmative votes in
the House and 24 in the Senate.
15. This act received only 64 affirmative votes in the House, the vote
on final passage being 65 to 1.
16. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 8215.
1. La. Act 331 of 1946.
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with other university presses throughout the country, and par-
ticularly enables it to bring before the public at large the extent
and quality of its publications.
Also amending Act 13 of the Extraordinary Session of 1940
is Act 194 of 1946 which permits the different parishes to pay the
higher rates charged by printers for official notices published in
the various official journals.2
Department of Commerce and Industry
Act 204 of 1944, which created the Department of Commerce
and Industry, provided for the establishment of a board for the
government thereof composed of twelve members appointed by
the governor, whose terms were to run concurrently with that
of the governor. Act 112 of 1946 amends these provisions, but it
is obvious the only effect of the amendment is to declare a va-
cancy in the offices of the board members presently in office, and
to authorize the appointment of new members by the governor,
as originally provided in the act. 3  Other amendments to the
original statute provide for the establishment of advisory com-
mittees composed of members appointed by the governor to assist
the department in the performance of its functions.
4
Department of Institutions
Act 47 of 1946 creates in the Department of Institutions, and
as a unit thereof, the Hot Wells Hospital of Rapides Parish, to
be administered by the department. At the same time, Act 220
of 1938, which originally created the hospital under the jurisdic-
tion and supervision of the State Hospital Board and the Board
of Health, was repealed. The 1946 statute also makes an appro-
priation of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for buildings
and improvements, and an appropriation of fifty thousand dol-
lars for maintenance and operation. Since the hospital was al-
ready in existence, and since it had previously been transferred
to the Department of Institutions under the provisions of Act 3
of 1942,r the present statute, but for the appropriations it carries,
accomplishes very little.
2. See also La. Act 193 of 1946, amending the pertinent provisions of La.
Act 49 of 1877, as amended, authorizing payment of Increased charges for
judicial advertisements.
3. The act provides . . . The terms of the present members of the Board
shall expire when this act takes effect, and the governor shall appoint
the members of the board as herein provided .. " La. Act 112 of 1946, § 2.
4. La. Act 204 of 1944, §§ 6, 7, as amended by La. Act 112 of 1946.
5. rL Act 3 of 1942, § 3 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 9328.2]: "The fol-
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Department of Veterans Affairs
As originally enacted, the statute creating this department
stated that its purpose was to administer the affairs of veterans
entitled to the benefits provided by the Congress of the United
States and of the State of Louisiana. Act 164 of 1946 has enlarged
the scope of the department by stating its purpose is to admin-
ister the affairs of veterans who are entitled to benefits "under
the laws of the United States and the several states thereof." No
other changes of any significance were made.
Athletic Commission
Act 325 of 1946 repeals the former statutes relative to the
athletic commission and in turn creates a new commission with
authority to regulate and control boxing and wrestling contests
in the state.7
Milk Commission
Act 192 of 1946 repealed all other statutes relative to the
regulation of the purchase, sale and distribution of milk within
the state,8 and established a new milk commission, composed of
the president of the State Board of Health, the Commissioner of
Agriculture, the head of the Louisiana State University Dairy
Department and nine other members appointed by the governor.
The commission is given the necessary authority to regulate the
sale and purchase of milk on the basis of butterfat content and
to adopt such regulations as are necessary to insure proper stand-
ards and grades.
In this connection Act 159 of 1946 is to be noted. This act
prohibits the shipment or transportation of milk and milk pro-
ducts into the state, unless the shipper has first obtained a per-
mit from the president of the Board of Health. The Board of
Health is authorized to set up standards which the product to be
shipped must meet and to require that every container must be
so labeled or tagged as to show that the product shipped is of
the standard required and that all regulations have been complied
with.
lowing boards, agents, agencies and institutions are hereby merged and
consolidated into the Department of Institutions: . . . The Hot Wells Hos-
pital (Rapides Parish) .... "
6. La. Act 98 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) §§ 9257-9257.12].
7. Cf. La. Act 279 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 9390-9411], which in
turn repealed all other former statutes.
8. La. Act 102 of 1932 and La. Act 195 of 1938 [Dart's Stats. (1939) H§
3262.1-3262.13].
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Recreation and Park Commission-Baton Rouge
Act 246 of 1946 is an enabling statute creating the Recreation
and Park Commission for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, which
will replace the present Baton Rouge Parish and Municipal Rec-
reation Commission, upon the adoption of the constitutional
amendment on which the statute is basedY
Board of State Affairs
Under Section 6 of Act 140 of 1916, the Board of State Affairs
was authorized to employ a secretary at a salary of forty-eight
hundred dollars per annum, as well as other necessary clerical
employees whose compensation was to be fixed by the board.
Act 76 of 1946 has modified these provisions by authorizing the
board to employ a secretary at a salary "as may be fixed by the
board," and by providing that all other clerical employees of the
board are subject to the civil service law.
State Printing Board
One of the controversial measures adopted at the 1946 ses-
sion of the legislature was Act 216 of 1946, which re-established
the State Printing Board previously abolished upon the adoption
of the Fiscal Code of 1942.10 The new board is composed of the
governor, the lieutenant governor, the director of the department
of commerce, the speaker of the house, and the secretary of the
senate. The declared purpose is to regulate state printing by let-
ting contracts to the lowest bidders only. The director of finance
is authorized to establish the basis upon which bids are to be
made and received, and to adopt such regulations as are neces-
sary for the proper administration of the statute. All bids are to
be accompanied by a faithful performance bond ranging from
ten thousand dollars to thirty-five thousand dollars, according to
the contract to be let, and all contracts must be approved by the
governor, the president of the senate and the speaker of the
house, or any two of them.
SuiTs AGAINST THE STATE
Under the provisions of the Constitution of 1913, the legisla-
ture was required to prescribe the particular method of procedure
provided therein in authorizing suits against the state. This
9. See La. Act 387 of 1946, proposing an amendment to La. Const. of
1921, Art. XIV, by adding a new subsection thereto.
10. Ia. Act 111 of 1942, tit. I, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 6631.9].
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procedure was uniform in all cases, all suits being required to
be brought in the district court at the capital of the state, service
of citation being made upon both the governor and the attorney
general. The supreme court was given appellate jurisdiction in
all cases, regardless of jurisdictional amount, and all claims had
to be reduced to a judgment rendered by the supreme court.'
Article III, Section 35, of the present Constitution was a depart-
ure from the previous requirement in that it merely prescribes
that the legislature shall provide a method of procedure and
the effect which the judgments rendered shall have.2 Thus, the
procedure need not be uniform in all cases, and, as evidenced by
the statutes enacted at the recent session,' the suits may be in-
stituted in any convenient court of competent jurisdiction, with
service of citation on the heads of the particular agencies or de-
partment involved, at the convenience of the parties. 4 Despite
this liberality, however, the provisions of this section of the
Constitution have been strictly construed, and all acts which
fail to prescribe the method of procedure to be followed are
held unconstitutional. 5
With the exception of one,6 all the acts passed by the legis-
lature of 1946 authorizing suits against the state met the present
requirements. They followed a general pattern of specifying
the court where the suit is to be brought, the person or persons
to be served, the manner in which the judgment is to be satisfied,
and in some instances, authorizing the compromise of the claim
on the recommendation of the attorney general.7
1. La. Const. of 1913, Art. 192.
2. La. Const. of 1921, Art. II, § 35.
3. See the list of statutes cited at p. 25, n. 11.
4. Cf. La. Act 19 of 1946, authorizing suit through the Department of
Wild Life and Fisheries, to be instituted in the district court either at East
Baton Rouge or Lafourche Parish, citation to be served on the commissioner
and on the attorney general; La. Act 40 of 1946, authorizing suit through
the Department of Institutions to be filed in the 19th Judicial District Court,
service to be made on the Director of Institutions and on the attorney gen-
eral; La- Act 41 of 1946, authorizing suit through the Department of High-
ways to be filed in the district court either in Baton Rouge or in the Parish
of East Carroll, service to be made on the director of the Department of
Highways and on the attorney general.
5. Lewis v. State, 196 La. 814, 200 So. 265 (1941); Martin v. State, 205 La.
1052, 18 So.(2d) 613 (1944). Cf. Lewis v. State, 207 La. 194, 20 So.(2d) 917 (1945).
6. La. Act 365 of 1946, which authorizes suit for personal injuries without
designating the forum or the persons upon whom service of citation is to be
made.
7. See La. Acts 19 and 40 of 1946. The validity of stipulations authorizing
the compromise of claims is questionable. The constitutional provision au-
thorizing suit against the state is merely a waiver of the state's immunity
to suit [Lewis v. State, 196 La. 814, 200 So. 265 (1941)] and does not in any
way authorize the compromise of claims but contemplates, on the other
hand, that no appropriation is to be made to pay any claims except upon a
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On the question as to whether an act which fails to state or
designate the forum where the suit is to be filed is deficient as
failing to provide for the procedure to be followed, the supreme
court in a recent decision stated unequivocally that such a statute
would not violate the constitutional requirements." This decision
is certainly a departure from the general understanding of the
meaning of "method of procedure" as used in the Constitution,
the designation of the forum being part of that method. No doubt
it is the purpose of Act 385 of 1946 to overrule this decision of
the supreme court. This act is a proposed amendment to Article
III, Section 35, of the Constitution of 1921, which, if adopted,
will require the legislature to provide the method for citing the
state, to designate the court or courts in which the suit is to be
instituted, and, except as to the method of citation and the juris-
diction of the courts, to provide for the method of procedure to
be the same as in the case of suits between private litigants.
While retaining the latitude presently enjoyed by the legislature
in choosing the forum and designating the parties upon whom
service of citation is to be made, this proposed amendment pro-
vides for a more or less uniform requirement to be contained in
all acts authorizing suits against the state. The amendment thus
will tend to diminish controversies as to the requirements for
valid legislation. However, it must be noted that the proposed
amendment merely clothes in legislative language the general
interpretation placed by the legislature and by the courts upon
the article of the Constitution, and does not require the legislature
judgment validly rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. See also La.
Const. of 1921, Art. IV, § 8, prohibiting the legislature from making any ap-
propriations for private purposes.
8. Lewis v. State, 207 La. 194, 20 So. (2d) 917 (1945), wherein the court
held: "The Legislature, in granting Miss Lewis the right to sue the State,
had the unrestricted power to provide a method of procedure and the effect
of the judgment which might be rendered in the suit. In passing Act 273 of
1942, the Legislature waived prescription and provided for the effect of any
judgment that might be rendered in favor of Miss Lewis. It is true it did
not In the body of the act designate the forum in which the suit should be
brought, but it was not obliged to do this, unless it decided to depart from
the well established rule of procedure that a tort action must be brought at
the domicile of the defendant as provided by Article 162 of the Code of
Practice, or in the parish where the tortious act was committed." (207 La.
194, 209, 20 So. (2d) 917, 921-922.) "If no mention whatever were made in
the title of the act of the courts In which the suit against the State might
be brought, it would not render the act unconstitutional, since it was the
obvious intention df the Legislature in passing the act that the suit au-
thorized therein should be brought at the seat of the state government, in
the Parish of East Baton Rouge .... Hence, It Is clear that the reference
in the title of the act to the courts in which the suit might be brought may
be regarded as mere surplusage and wholly unnecessary for the accomplish-
ing of the purpose the Legislature had in mind...." (207 La. 194, 211, 20 So.
(2d) 917, 922.)
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to do any more than it has generally done in the past. Had the
proposal contained a self-operative standard method of procedure
for instituting suits against the state, prescribing the method of
citation and designation of the courts in which such suits should
be brought,9 much of the confusion now arising would have been
eliminated.
In this connection, Act 371 is also worthy of note. It amends
the Workmen's Compensation Act of 191410 by adding a new
section to provide that in all cases where suit is brought against
the state, or any board or other agency thereof, on a claim for
workmen's compensation under the act, the suit is to be instituted
in the district court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, if against
the state, and if the suit is against a board or other agency, the
suit is to be brought in the district court either at the domicile
of the nominal defendant agency or at the domicile of the plain-
tiff at the time the injury occurred. When the suit is against
the state, service is to be made on both the governor and the
attorney general, and, in the case of suits against any board or
other agency, the service is to be made on the president or chair-
man thereof or upon any other officer authorized to receive
such service.1
Again, the evident purpose of this amendment is to correct
the deficiency in the workmen's compensation statute in that,
although that act purports to grant an exclusive right of action
to state employees for compensation for injuries sustained while
in the scope of their employment,' 2 it failed to provide for the
procedure to be followed in instituting the suit. In line with
the settled jurisprudence on the subject, the supreme court
held that the provisions of the act which authorized suits
against the state for compensation were unconstitutional.'3 In
view of this holding, it may be doubtful that the present amend-
ment accomplishes its purpose, for, although a method of pro-
9. Cf. La. Act 371 of 1946. For further discussion as to methods of set-
tling claims against the state see supra p. 52.
10. La. Act 20 of 1914 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4391-4432].
11. La. Act 371 of 1946.
12. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4391].
13. "When the legislature undertakes to authorize a suit against the
state, it is its mandatojry duty to provide the method of procedure and the
effect to be given to the Judgment which may be rendered in such suit. As
no such provision is contained in Act No. 20 of 1914, or in any of its amend-
ments relating to recovery against the State in suits for workmen's com-
pensation, the provisions contained in Act No. 20 of 1914 authorizing the
bringing of suit for compensation against the State is violative of Article
192 of the Constitution of 1913, as well as Article 3, Section 35 of the Con-
stitution of 1921." (Italics supplied.) Martin v. State, 205 La. 1052, 1059-1060,
18 So.(2d) 613, 616 (1944).
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cedure is now provided, the right of action originally conferred
by the statute might be regarded as non-existent, since the pro-
visions which granted it were declared unconstitutional."
MISCELLANEOUS
Commercial Buildings
Under the provisions of Act 375 of 1946, all commercial build-
ings to be constructed in the future in cities having a population
of more than fifty thousand inhabitants must have safety bolts
in all windows on all floors above the second story to safeguard
employees engaged in window cleaning, window repair work,
et cetera.
Intoxicating Liquors
The alcoholic beverage laws were amended so as to give
local authorities full discretion in the granting of licenses for
the dispensing of vinous or spirituous liquors. Also, the license
fees for both wholesalers and retailers were increased.'
Libraries
The library formerly operated by the Louisiana Library
Commission will now be known as the Louisiana State Library; 2
the name of the law library located in the New Court House
Building at New Orleans has been changed to "Law Library of
Louisiana" and it and the Huey P. Long Memorial Library are
now placed under the control of the attorney general.8
Mental Health
Act 303 of 1946 is a complete integrated statute providing
for the discovery and treatment of mental disorders. The act
provides in detail for the examination, admission, commitment
14. A statute which has been declared unconstitutional may be revived,
but only by a full re-enactment of the statute or of the unconstitutional
provisions. State v. Walters, 135 La. 1070, 66 So. 364 (1914); Dilly v. East Fe-
liciana Parish, 6 So.(2d) 699 (La. App. 1942). See also Police Jury v. Mayor
of Shreveport, 137 La. 1032, 69 So. 828 (1915). In a subsequent suit the plain-
tiff in the Martin case, supra note 13, obtained additional authority by Act
155 of 1944 "to institute suit under the provisions of Act 20 of 1914," and was
permitted to recover. Martin v. State, 25 So.(2d) 251 (La. App. 1946). The
court of appeal did not pass on the question of constitutionality of the pro-
visions of the workmen's compensation act giving state employees a right
of action under the act. It is clear that the special authority conferred on
the plaintiff was the basis of the suit.
1. La. Acts 190 and 384 of 1946.
2. La. Act 102 of 1946.
3. La. Act 103 of 1946.
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and detention of mental patients, as well as for their transfer
and discharge from mental institutions. All previous laws rela-
tive to the commitment of the mentally incompetent have been
repealed.
Microfilm
State departments, boards and commissions may now install
microfilm machinery and apparatus for the recordation of all
public documents. Provision is also made for the admission in
evidence of microfilmed documents which are declared to have
the same weight as originals.4
Parks and Playgrounds
Act 129 of 1946 authorizes the State Parks Commission to
purchase a site on the West shore of Lake Bisteneau for develop-
ment into a state park, and for the purpose, an appropriation of
$25,000.00 was made; and by Act 138 of 1946, the purchase of the
site of the battle of New Orleans at Chalmette was authorized,
for the purpose of transferring it to the Federal Government for
the construction of a National Park.
Public Officers and Employees
Sections 55 and 56 of Act 4 of 1942, made it unlawful for any
officer or employee of the department of highways, or for a
member of the legislature, to be in any way interested in any
contract to be awarded by the department, under penalty of fine
or imprisonment. These sections have been amended by Act 368
of 1946, to provide that officers of the executive department and
members of the legislature who are licensed contractors, are not
prohibited from bidding on, or from being awarded, contracts
for the buildings of highways, or other public works constructed
under the supervision of the highway department.
Public Utilities
Act 373 of 1946 declares the transportation of gas by pipe-
line is impressed with a public interest and as such, subject to
regulation by the state. Authority is conferred on the Public
Service Commission to adopt such regulations as are necessary
for the control thereof.
State Employees
All honorably discharged veterans formerly employed by
4. La. Act 272 of 1946.
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the state may be reinstated, upon proper application, to their
former positions or employment held at the time of entering
the service.5
Tax Collectors
Tax collectors are required to mail additional notices to each
tax debtor listed on the assessment rolls, stating the amount of
the tax due for the current year, requesting payment, and stating
the date on which the tax will become delinquent.,
Unfair Sales Act
The unfair sales statute which makes it unlawful to sell
goods below cost, as defined therein, has been amended to pro-
hibit absorption of the sales tax by retailers.8
Vital Statistics
The vital statistics act9 was amended to provide for a fee of
fifty cents to be paid to the clerk of court preparing certificates
in divorce and annulment cases. This fee is to be taxed as costs
against the party cast in the suit.""
5. La. Act 311 of 1946.
6. La. Act 250 of 1946.
7. La. Act 338 of 1940 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 4931.1-4931.8].
8. La. Act 256 of 1946.
9. La. Act 180 of 1942 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1946) § 3484.1 et seq.].
10. La. Act 350 of 1946.
[VOL. VII
